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Abstract 
The matter of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans has become overshadowed by 
pressing issues such as Brexit, the rise of the radical right and international terrorism. 
Notwithstanding the pressure to address these issues accordingly, increasing tensions 
and ethnic outbursts across the Western Balkans are reason enough for the European 
Union to devote significant attention to accession talks. This thesis addresses the 
Western Balkan countries’ Europeanization process with consideration of Russia as an 
external actor. The inclinations of Western Balkan countries toward the EU incite 
Moscow to increase its presence in the region with the aim of diverting countries from 
the path to European integration. Drawing on the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism 
and a rational approach to European integration, the research argues that the rational and 
pragmatic impetus behind the Europeanization dynamic brings to the forefront long-
term economic, security and geopolitical benefits for the Western Balkan countries. By 
assessing the candidate countries’ progress amid EU negotiations, the thesis suggests 
that the countries’ bilateral ties with Russia have an impact on the Europeanization 
process. This tendency is particularly visible in Chapter 31 Foreign, security, and 
defence policy of the acquis communautaire. The broader geopolitical framework 
comprises the multifaceted relationship between the EU and Russia that is crucial for 
understanding the dynamics of EU-Western Balkans-Russia triangle. 
 
Keywords: Western Balkans, European Union, Europeanization process, Russia, liberal 
intergovernmentalism, rational choice to European integration, EU-Russia relations, 
coalition government, geopolitics. 
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1. Introduction 
  
ˈThere will be no enlargement in the next five years, the EU needs to mark a 
pause in its enlargement process so that we can consolidate what has been done with 
28ˈ, were the exact words of president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, in 2014, when he reassured the public that no further enlargement would take 
place under his presidency. Although more than half his mandate has already passed, 
recent developments do not provide hope for a change after Juncker leaves his post. 
Global changes which brought about the (un)expected presidency of Donald J. Trump 
might alter the nature of US foreign policy in Transatlantic relations and affect further 
EU transformative power in its neighbourhood. Russia’s assertive foreign policy in the 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhood does not contribute to the overall improvement of 
EU-Russia relations. Ever since the president Trump’s discussion regarding NATO’s 
continued usefulness, the EU has started consolidating its own military and defensive 
forces to counter security threats looming over its borders. While president Trump’s 
stance on NATO is ambiguous, the rhetoric he employs to address the EU is becoming 
increasingly anti-European. Not since the foundation of the EU has America's foreign 
policy been as antagonistic towards the EU as it is today under president Trump. This is 
probably the most challenging period for the EU to think about further deepening and 
widening due to many reasons ‒ Brexit, external security threats, the rise of far-right 
populism, identity and political crises. The refugee crisis and the even more chaotic 
response which followed have shattered the EU’s image. Brexit, being officially 
triggered in March 2017, with no historic precedent, has left the EU in a position to 
develop a completely new strategy for consolidating the ˈUnion of 27ˈ.  
Yet Western Balkan (WB) countries cling to the idea of possible membership to 
the EU. The European Union has embraced enlargement as its most effective foreign 
policy tool – and can credibly argue that the EU’s enlargement has been the most 
successful democracy promotion policy ever implemented by an external actor 
(Vachudova 2014: 122). The enlargement process continues to have a ˈdemocratizing 
effectˈ, as WB candidates and proto-candidates respond to the incentives of EU 
membership: political parties have changed their agendas to make them EU-compatible, 
and governments have implemented policy changes to move forward in the pre-
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accession process (Vachudova 2014: 122). Being torn by economic issues, corruption, 
institutional complexities with regard to the rule of law and good governance, it seems 
highly likely that the only alternative to overhauling economic performance and state 
administration is to join the privileged community. Given such economic problems and 
disparities among WB countries, it would be in countries’ national interest to receive 
institutional guidance and policy recommendations from the EU. Not only do countries 
acquire long-term economic and geopolitical benefits, but also gain a unique possibility 
to influence decision-making at the supranational level.  
Russia’s impact on the accession process, which will be thoroughly examined in 
this thesis, comes somewhere in-between; on the one hand, the process of EU 
negotiations requires countries to delegate some of their competencies to the EU level 
and comply with rules and regulations already set-in-stone, whereas, on the other hand, 
it still gives countries enough space to tackle their internal and external policies 
independently. This independence in making choices is exactly where the ˈRussian 
factorˈ fits nicely. This research shall, thus, focus on examining the extent of Russia’s 
impact on the process of EU accession negotiations. Because stalling the 
Europeanization process can be traced to both internal and external factors of the 
countries in question, the internal factors, which in the WB countries’ case are even 
more likely to hinder the EU negotiations, will be kept constant so that the assessment 
of the external impact can be done more accurately. 
For the purpose of this research, it is paramount to understand the common 
history of WB countries which at some point became an excessive burden, and difficult 
to deal with. The process of integration of the WB has coincided with the 
dismemberment of Yugoslavia and social and ethnic fragmentation at the domestic level 
throughout the region (Türkes and Gökgöz 2006: 662). After the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in 1991, the communist regime ‒ once the main ideological foundation in 
the region ‒ now ceased to exist. Starting from 1991, the Balkan wars provoked disarray 
in several countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia, and Croatia) leaving them 
with mistrust, war memory, remorse towards neighbours, minority complexity, and 
unresolved issues with missing and displaced people. Similar cultural and language 
traits, which can be traced across these countries, influenced heavily on the post-war 
identity construction in the war-torn region. The resurfacing of ethnic conflict and 
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subsequent war in Yugoslavia, coupled with difficulties of the ˈdouble process of 
transition and integrationˈ, led to a redistribution of internal political and economic 
power and sparked the search for external integration (Türkes 2004 as cited in Türkes 
and Gökgöz 2006: 673).  
In 2013, Croatia managed to transform its institutions in accordance with the 
acquis and joined the EU. Other WB countries are still far from meeting necessary 
economic and political criteria for the EU accession. The problems occur in the areas of 
judiciary, corruption, organized crime, minority protection, economic performance, the 
rule of law and good governance. Regardless of the fact that political elites have 
adopted strong Europeanization discourse and put EU integration high on their agendas, 
political layout and incumbent governments across official and potential EU candidates 
indicate more differences than similarities. Distrust in representative institutions and 
disengagement from political life runs dramatically high among the people of the 
Balkan countries, and this generalized sense of dissatisfaction is starting to breed 
cynicism towards the idea of a better future inside the Union (Stratulat, 2014: xi). 
Thusly, not only is Russia’s factor driving apart these countries, but there are also 
internal factors present which are preventing countries from having a clear pro-
European vision. That being said, the puzzle of this research revolves around divergence 
among WB countries and their EU accession process with respect to Russia. How come 
these countries, despite having a common historical background and clear pro-European 
vision, i.e. being either EU member states or EU candidates, can differ in regards to 
Russia’s involvement in the region?  
The idea for this topic arose from the lack of academic research in the 
comparative analysis of WB countries with respect to two actors ‒ Russia and the EU. 
Most of the academic work on WB region entails either Russian presence within the 
country in question or EU accession negotiations with that country, but comprehensive 
study which would analyse the WB region as a common platform, where EU and 
Russian interests collide, is still needed. This research could be a starting point for 
undertaking more studies on the topic which would eventually deepen and broaden 
perspectives on the region and diagnose the most critical issues. It is believed that the 
matter of WB countries accession to the EU is topical and of importance for the future 
of the EU as a whole. The discontent which prevails across WB countries with regards 
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to politics, corruption, and other internal issues is dividing the population into pro-EU 
and anti-EU supporters. The WB region remains a time bomb which might have 
pernicious effects on neighbouring regions. Additionally, the presence of various 
external actors throughout the region might stifle countries’ progress towards the EU 
due to their various security, economic, and political interests. Along these lines, this 
research sees its purpose in inspecting one of those external factors which have a sound 
possibility to impede the progress toward the EU. 
While Russia’s presence in the region dates back decades, the geopolitical 
landscape has changed and Russia has come forth as a worrisome factor to EU 
integration and not an EU partner, to say the least. It is, therefore, relevant to inspect the 
possibility of Russia having an upper hand in issues that are pertinent for EU 
negotiations. The EU faces an uphill struggle trying to reconcile countries’ past with 
present challenges and future EU obligations. The primary aim is to assess the scope of 
Russian influence on EU negotiations of the WB countries. In light of the dynamic 
nature of EU-Russia relations, this research seeks to find answers to whether the 
countries’ commitments to the EU are indisputable and to what extent Russia influences 
these countries’ internal affairs. In this respect, two research questions are set 
accordingly:  
RQ1 How do country’s close bilateral ties with Russia affect the 
 Europeanization process?  
RQ2 How could the volatile nature of EU-Russia relations be the reason for 
 stalling the Europeanization process in countries with closer ties to Russia?  
 The two hypotheses have been formulated with the aim of addressing the 
research questions in a concise and straightforward manner:  
 H1 Those WB countries with more historically, economically and geopolitically 
 entrenched relations with Russia are more likely to stall the Europeanization 
 process.  
  H2 All else being equal, those WB countries with closer ties to Russia are more 
 likely to stall the Europeanization process during periods of increasingly 
 strained EU-Russia relations.  
5 
 
 This research looks into two case studies which serve as a representative sample 
of the WB region. These two cases have been selected according to criteria defined in 
the methodology chapter. Apart from the comparison of these cases, the study of each 
case consists of discourse analysis of EU official documents, as well as in-depth 
examination of countries’ bilateral relations with Russia in fields which are believed to 
be of value for the research. In order to define the exact time frame needed for 
proceeding with the research, two defining moments in EU-Russia relations have been 
identified:  
 1) Positive EU-Russia relations (2008-2011) and  
 2) Strained EU-Russia relations (2012-2015). 
Since all countries in the WB region have expressed a strong EU commitment 
and set themselves on European trajectory ‒ some already being EU members and other 
EU candidate countries ‒ no one is questioning Russia’s role in influencing the outcome 
of EU negotiations. Nonetheless, if the EU keeps (un)intentionally neglecting WB 
countries, it is highly likely that Russia will try to exert its influence. The European 
Commission president has put the WB countries low on his agenda, which to a certain 
extent, speaks of the EU’s willingness to bring these countries closer to the EU. In case 
hypotheses are verified and show that Russia does play a significant role in the region, it 
might suggest that in order to keep its influence, the EU should commit more and re-
think the approach it applies in light of Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). 
Considering WB countries’ difficulties to meet political and economic criteria (Qorraj 
2010), it remains to be seen what would happen if some countries fall short in meeting 
criteria and find themselves left out of the WB accession package. Is the EU willing to 
make a substantial effort in order to continue with the process of Europeanization and 
let these countries in eventually? Or, given the challenges facing the EU, is the WB 
accession even on the agenda? The answer to this dilemma would also clarify Russia’s 
position in the WB region and give further insights into how strong Russian influence is 
across the region. 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one gives a brief overview 
and sets the problem within the defined time framework. It also defines the research 
questions and hypotheses. The second chapter introduces the main theoretical principles 
on which the paper rests and discusses the most relevant academic works in the form of 
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a literature review. A short overview of countries’ position vis-à-vis Russia and the EU 
is also given and two case studies are presented. The methodology is outlined in the 
third chapter with an in-depth explanation of variables used in the analysis. The 
following chapter analyses independent, dependent and intervening variables of two 
case studies and ends with case studies comparison presented in a form of a table. 
Findings and questions for future debate are discussed in the later chapter, where the 
author seeks to identify limitations and define issues for further research which go 
beyond the scope of this paper. The conclusions are drawn in the final chapter.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
Intergovernmentalism, or at least a contemporary variant of it, continues to 
dominate much of the academic discourse on European integration at the start of the 
twenty-first century, even if many researchers into EU politics would rather this were 
not the case (Cini 2007: 100). Intergovernmentalist theory, in turn, drew largely from 
the soft rational choice tradition of realist theory, identifying the EU’s member 
governments implicitly or explicitly as rational actors who were both aware of and 
capable of forestalling the transfer of authority to supranational institutions in Brussels 
(Hoffmann 1966 as cited in Pollack 2006: 36). As a conceptual approach, 
intergovernmentalism sees integration as a zero-sum game, claims that it is limited to 
policy areas that do not touch on fundamental issues of national sovereignty, and argues 
that ˈEuropean integration is driven by the interests and actions of nation states (Hix 
1999 as cited in Cini 2007: 100). In various writings, and particularly in his book, The 
Choice for Europe, Moravcsik refined intergovernmentalism into an explicitly 
rationalist theory in which actors were clearly specified, and predictions about outcomes 
made, at various levels of analysis (Pollack 2006: 36).  
The liberal intergovermentalism theory as we know it today has its roots in the 
international political economy that was elaborated by Robert Keohane. The author 
elaborates on state’s behaviour in the international politics in the book Transnational 
Relations and World Politics (1971) by explaining the correlation between state 
preferences and globalisation, whereas in the book Power and Interdependence (2001), 
Keohane seeks to introduce a new concept of interstate bargaining power which derives 
from asymmetrical independence. Following this line of thought, Moravscik and 
Schimmelfennig (2009) explain how the concept of asymmetrical interdependence can 
be applied to the EU negotiation process since the EU has the leverage to impose 
conditionality on candidate countries due to their one-sided dependence on EU 
economy. It explains how interstate power stems not from the possession of coercive 
power resources, but from asymmetric in issue-specific interdependence. In other 
words, the more resources one country possesses (or the less it needs), the stronger it is; 
conversely, the less a country has of it (or the more it needs), the weaker it is (Milner & 
Moravscik 2009: 249). This concept can be applied to EU negotiation practice during 
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which the EU – acting as a supranational institution with the support of the member 
states – has the leverage to impose strong conditionality on EU candidate countries and 
compel them to sacrifice more in order to acquire EU membership status and attached to 
it economic privileges. Taylor (2013), on the other hand, goes a step further and 
examines the feasibility of network governance in the context of the EU’s potential 
expansion to the WB countries. 
LI model nests three complementary middle-range theories: the assumption of 
rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an 
intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation (Moravscik 1993: 480). Inasmuch 
as this thesis seeks to examine applicants’ enlargement preferences which are mainly 
connected with materialistic conditions, the assumption of rational state behaviour 
seems to be the most suitable theoretical framework. A rationalist approach to 
enlargement has identified various sources of enlargement preferences, among which 
are general systems conditions, such as changes in the world economy, in technology, 
or the security environment – for instance, the denationalization of the economy creates 
incentives for joining an international economic organization (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier 2006: 13). Unlike intergovernmentalism, Moravscik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism offers updated account of European integration where domestic 
politics affect the national interests’ formulation. Domestic groups compete for political 
influence by pressurizing the government to adopt their policy alternatives as national 
interests. By treating states as independent actors which use supranational institutions 
for the sake of achieving their goals, LI touches upon the very nature of international 
bargaining. As a synthesis of existing theories of foreign economic policy, 
intergovernmental negotiation, and international regimes, LI rests on the assumption 
that state behaviour reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by 
domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment (Moravscik 1993: 
473).  
Nonetheless, it does not explain all the aspects of European integration, neither 
it takes into consideration other factors included in interstate bargaining and 
negotiations between the EU and prospective member states. While LI elaborates the 
mechanisms of decision-making process where the member states act as ˈmasters of the 
treatyˈ by tailoring EU politics according to their views and preferences, it does not 
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focus in depth on the behaviour of countries aspiring to join the EU, which lies at the 
core of rationalist approach to the European integration. Often perceived as a baseline 
theory, the success of LI lies not in its generality, ambition, parsimony or other formal 
attributes, but in the apparent accuracy of substantive assumptions and empirical 
predictions, it advances about European politics. It argues that one cannot explain 
integration with just one factor, but instead seeks to link together multiple theories and 
factors into a single coherent approach appropriate to explaining the trajectory of 
integration over time (Moravscik & Schimmelfenig 2009: 68). Although the theory was 
criticized for placing too much emphasis on states as the main actors, and by doing so, 
downplaying the importance of EU supranational institutions, precisely this kind of 
theory is needed in assessing the process of integration of WB countries to the EU. 
Given the main focus of the thesis is on WB countries which seek EU integration due to 
their interests and preferences, the thesis seeks to underline the states as the main 
drivers of EU negotiations process in order to understand rationale factors which lie 
behind this dynamic.  
In view of this, the rationalist approach to European integration goes beyond LI 
theory and offers a wider framework for inspecting not only the dynamic of member 
states within the EU but also the nature of negotiations where a special emphasis is put 
on applicant countries’ preferences. The assumption of rational state behaviour provides 
a general framework for analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic 
interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences, while the relative 
intensity of national preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the 
opportunity for issue linkages provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the 
resolution of distributional conflicts among governments (Moravscik 1993: 480-481). 
This rationality in the decision-making process, regardless of whether the decision is 
made by the member states of applicant countries, is what binds together LI theory and 
rationalist approach to European integration. 
The rational approach to EU enlargement, as the main theoretical foundation of 
this thesis, has been widely discussed among political scientists and in many instances 
used to provide insights into the political system of the EU. Pollack (2006) claims that 
the approach did not originate in the study of the EU but rather should be understood as 
a broad approach to social theory, capable of generating an array of specific theories 
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and testable hypotheses about a range of human behaviour. In light of this, at the 
broadest level, rational choice, as Snidal (2002) sees it, is a methodological approach 
that explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual 
goal-seeking under constraints. Vachudova (2014) adopts a similar perspective of a 
rationalist approach to EU enlargement by putting forward an argument which identifies 
cost-benefit mechanism due to which WB countries want to join the EU. According to 
her, EU member states see enlargement as a matter of nationalist interest, bringing long-
term economic and geopolitical benefits. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir (2005) also 
argue that the main theoretical foundation of rationalist hypotheses revolves around 
expected individual costs and benefits which then determine the applicants’ and the 
member states’ preferences. In this respect, authors explain how an applicant country 
seeks to expand its institutional ties with the organization – reaping positive net benefits 
from enlargement, and these benefits are greater than those that would be secured from 
an alternative form of horizontal institutionalization. Moravscik (1993) complements 
the argument by describing how national governments have an incentive to co-operate 
where policy coordination increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, 
enabling them to achieve goals that would not otherwise be possible. Other authors, 
such as Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) adopt the same perspective and explain the 
ˈstrategic featureˈ in actors’ behaviour which they use to adapt their strategies and 
beliefs to the assumed actions of other players.  
Regardless of a broad array of specialists who recognize the importance of a 
rationalist approach to the EU enlargement, the theory has been subjected to various 
criticisms. Abbott and Sindall (2002) were one of the first to expose flaws in the 
approach. According to them, rationalist explanations are seriously incomplete since 
they do not take into account the significant role of values and value actors in most 
international issues. Although rational choice provides a flexible methodology capable 
of incorporating actors with widely disparate goals, it is inadequate simply to define 
values as another category of interests. In other words, authors argue that applying 
solely rationalist assumption without taking into consideration an ideational facet 
(which entails values and identity-related matters) is an incomplete approach (Fearon & 
Wendt 2002; Kratochvil & Tulmets 2010). Similarly, Christiansen et al. (1992) claim 
that European integration has a transformative power on the interests and identities of 
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individuals, but that this transformation will remain largely invisible in approaches that 
neglect process of identity formation and/or assume interests to be given exogenously. 
The rational choice approach assumes that actors behave in a strategic manner, adapting 
their strategies and beliefs to the assumed actions of other players (Aspinwall & 
Schenider 2000: 16).  
LI, thus, similarly to rationalist approach to European integration, sees national 
interests as a crucial part of international negotiations and a key driver for governments 
when defining goals domestically. The economic interests, financial endorsements and 
geopolitical factors which account for security interdependence suggest that the 
government is empowered to influence international negotiations for the sake of 
achieving domestic goals and preserving national interests. The outcomes of 
intergovernmental negotiations are determined by the relative bargaining power of 
governments and the functional incentives for institutionalization created by high 
transaction costs and the desire to control domestic agendas (Moravscik 1993: 517).  
Another area where LI theory and rationalist approach to European integration 
contemplate one another is with regard to the rationalist-constructivist axis. Ideological 
concerns and linkages to other concerns, such as geopolitics, are likely to play a 
stronger role when economic interests are weak and cause-effect relations are uncertain 
(Moravscik & Schimmelfennig 2009: 85). A community of basic political values and 
norms is at best a necessary condition of enlargement. In the absence of net economic or 
security benefits, having common values and norms is not a positive incentive for 
expanding the organisation (Schimmelfennig 2001: 61). The rationalist approach is still 
the dominant approach to the study of European integration in international relations 
theory, with constructivism being its primary rival, but less developed one (Pollack 
2001: 221). Although aware that rationalism and constructivism are at the same time 
two complementary and competing approaches to EU enlargement, this thesis will shed 
light on materialist factors, being inextricably connected to the rationalist facet, rather 
than being grounded in constructivism. Thus, while conducting research and examining 
differences with respect to rationalist choice approach, all other factors which might 
derive from a constructivist approach shall not be taken into consideration. 
For the above-mentioned reasons, the focus of this thesis shall be exclusively on 
rationalist assumption to European integration which will encompass economic, 
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geopolitical and security concerns related to Russian involvement in WB region and 
implications it might have on EU accession negotiations. These dimensions also serve 
as references for determining the variable system for the analysis. Further elaboration of 
the rationality in decision-making with respect to rationalist approach to European 
integration is presented in the chapter that follows.  
2.1. Rationale behind the Western Balkans’ EU aspirations  
 
The basic equation underpinning the enlargement decision for eligible 
neighbouring states has not changed: the benefits of joining the EU (and the costs of 
being excluded from it) create incentives for governments to satisfy EU’s extensive 
entry requirements (Vachudova 2014: 128). It is the same mechanism that prevents 
countries from curtailing relations with Russia during the accession negotiations. 
National governments have an incentive to co-operate where policy coordination 
increases their control over domestic policy outcomes, permitting them to achieve goals 
that would not otherwise be possible (Moravscik 1993: 485). The theoretical rationalist 
assumption seeks to capture underlying factors in WB countries’ accession to the EU by 
placing an emphasis on candidate countries’ preferences and their calculations with 
respect to the EU project. As rationalism would lead us to expect, countries reflect 
egoistic calculations of, and conflict about, national welfare and security benefits or 
national attitudes to integration, not a collective ˈCommunity interestsˈ 
(Schimmelfennig 2001: 53).  
Even though the focus of the thesis will be exclusively on EU integration, the 
overall vision of WB countries centers on their long-term plans to join both the EU and 
NATO. Hence, useful insights into WB countries’ relations with NATO are also worth 
taking into account and as such are elaborated by several authors (Antonenko 2007; 
Seroka 2007; Luša 2012; Begović 2014). Academic works so far have sought to 
examine the EU strategy towards WB countries, as well as the ongoing democratization 
process (Türkes & Gökgöz 2006; Veljanoska et al. 2014; Rupnik 2011). Given the main 
complexities in the WB region ‒ ethnic cleansing, armed conflicts, secession and 
autocratic governance – the EU along with NATO and OSCE offered WB countries a 
possibility to work on building legitimacy, transparency, democracy and the rule of law. 
Türkes and Gökgöz (2006) put forward an argument how the EU strategy as integrated 
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and effective seem quite reasonable, particularly if one considers the quantity of post-
Dayton EU initiatives. Blockmans (2007) argues how mismanagement of the remaining 
ethnic-territorial and constitutional issues in the WB could have severe and destabilizing 
consequences, including a greater likelihood of political extremism, an increase in 
organized crime and other illegal economic activities, terrorism, armed conflict and 
further human displacement. Leaving WB countries to deal with the remaining ethnic-
territorial and constitutional issues alone would have a destabilizing effect, which would 
eventually lead to a negative spillover onto neighbouring EU member states.  
Given the opportunity that would enable WB countries to completely transform 
their political, economic, judiciary and institutional set-up, the literature, for the most 
part, suggests that the route to Europe is the most practical solution for these countries. 
Belloni (2009) argues how integration into European institutions is the best conflict 
management and development approach for WB countries. The same argument of 
regional approach Vesnic-Alujevic (2012) uses in her article European Integration of 
Western Balkans: From Reconciliation to European Future. In addition to that, Elbasani 
(2013) argues how European membership has emerged as the cornerstone of the 
region’s future since all targeted countries advance up the institutional ladder envisaged 
by the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Zielonka (2006) argues how the 
process of negotiations opens WB societies to alternative worldviews and prospects, 
encouraging much-needed domestic debate. In her article, Delević (2007) writes on the 
subject of regional cooperation and confirms that eventual integration in the EU is the 
most cherished objective of WB countries.  
When it comes to the EU approach to WB region, the opinion of scholars seems 
to differ. Schenker (2008) went as far as to question the SAP and the effect it has had on 
five WB countries so far. The main concern in his work is whether the SAP is a strong 
instrument for ensuring political and economic stability in the region. Fraenkel (2016) 
assesses the possible scenario of WB countries remaining outside of the Union 
indefinitely. In that case, the continuing status quo could, in turn, further countries’ 
downward economic and political spiral, which – among other things – would boost the 
organized crime and out-migration. As Fraenkel explains, countries might seek their 
way out by aligning themselves with other powerful countries in the region, mainly 
naming Russia and Turkey as the alternatives. However, such alternative does not entail 
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an integration perspective as it is the case with the EU, but rather deeper economic 
cooperation and a security guarantee. Renner and Trauner (2009), on the other hand, 
have no doubts about the EU leverage in the WB countries and argue that it has 
remained high due to a dual strategy, first of which is the prospect of membership and 
additional short-term incentives at a more subordinated level, such as extra financial 
assistance for sectoral integration or the promise of visa liberalisation.  
The reasons for EU to support enlargement to the WB are the same as for earlier 
enlargements: fostering stable democratic regimes in the EU’s backyard (or internal 
courtyard). There is the perception of abiding geopolitical risks: the EU will pay the 
price in myriad ways for ethnic conflict, economic collapse, lawlessness, instability and 
poor governance in the region if it does not pursue enlargement (Vachudova 2014: 126). 
As a regional power, the EU cannot run the risk of reviving the 1990s conflicts, when it 
proved the incapability of maintaining order on its own borders. The escalation of 
ethnic and political conflicts in a fragile WB region could cast doubt on the EU 
transformative power, effectiveness and credibility as a foreign policy actor. If the pace 
[of enlargement] does decelerate, overshadowed by the economic and political crises 
within the European Union, Europe might ‘lose’ the Balkans once more to nationalism, 
violence and further breakdowns of agreed states and borders, or it might lose its 
leverage to other actors who may not share similar views and values with the EU 
(Balfour 2011:2). 
2.1.1. Russia as an external (f)actor 
 
Russian interests in WB are driven by several factors. Firstly, Russia, being a 
permanent member of UN Security Council, has the right to veto every decision aimed 
at WB countries which does not match Russian interests. The Kremlin’s actions in the 
region – including meddling in the domestic politics of Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (hereafter FYROM), BiH, or Montenegro, and wielding its UN Security 
Council veto on Balkan matters, or threatening to – have only reinforced the notion that 
Russia ˈis backˈ in the region (Lasheras et al. 2016). It makes Russia present in the 
region not only via different disinformation strategies but also by directly influencing 
political debates and interfering in countries’ internal affairs, as it was the case in 2016 
when Russia was accused of organising plot to assassinate Montenegrin Prime Minister 
15 
 
(PM) (Forster 2016). Secondly, Rachev (2012) argues how the WB region is of strategic 
importance as a transit route for Russian gas. Where gas is imported, Russia’s Gazprom 
often enjoys exclusive rights with respect to access to infrastructure and other non-
competitive privileges, such as a prohibition of re-sale or re-export (International 
Energy Agency 2008). Thirdly, Clark & Foxwall (2014) emphasize this ideational 
dimension of Russian foreign policy which manifests itself through Slavic roots and 
Orthodox religion in some countries in the Balkans. Common traditional and cultural 
values again after the Soviet collapse became the foundation for dialogue at a high 
political level between Russia and the Western Balkans leaders (Lo 2002).  
Seeing the bigger picture, one can also examine Russia’s impact on EU external 
governance. The external governance is determined by the EU's power and its 
interdependence with regard to third countries as well as competing ‘governance 
providers’ in its neighborhood and at the global level – mainly the US and Russia 
(Lavenex & Schimmelfenig 2010). The EU enlargement has indirectly bolstered an 
atmosphere of contestation between the EU and Russia not only in the shared 
neighborhood (Ukraine, Moldova, and South Caucasus) but also in WB region where 
Russia has its geopolitical interests. Moscow’s strategic alliance with several WB 
countries provides a low-cost opportunity for Russia to undertake hybrid action to 
undermine European objectives in the Balkans (Weslau & Wilson 2016). Seen from the 
perspective of Moscow, the European Union is not only the primary trading partner but 
also a source of identity for, and a challenge to, Russia’s domest ic and foreign policy 
choices (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016: 4). By enlarging to the East, the EU had the 
leverage to influence the wider environment in which Russian economic interests were 
challenged. [M]any issues where the EU has tried to exercise its influence have been 
matters that have belonged to Moscow’s own remit as a fully sovereign decision-maker 
(Forsberg & Haukkala 2016: 9). The EU’s engagement with Ukraine – a key transit 
nation and a major customer for Russian gas – threatened to limit Russian commercial 
leverage and imperiled energy trading schemes that were an important vehicle for the 
Putin regime’s use of corruption as a tool of political influence (Greene 2012).  
In addition, a lot of research has been conducted on how EaP countries affect 
EU-Russia relations and vice versa, how EaP countries became the ground for exporting 
neighborhood policies by the EU and Russia. In their article, Dimitreva and Dragneva 
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(2009) discuss that the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance cannot be assessed 
without looking at the broader geopolitical and historical framework in which the Union 
extends its influence. Popescu (2014) explains the second alternative that EaP countries 
have in the form of Eurasian Union and goes into depth with implications on both EU 
and Russia’s neighborhood policies. Charap and Troitskiy (2014) deal with ˈtwo 
alternativesˈ for the EaP countries on the example of Ukraine. However, further 
academic research, which would cover both Russia’s and EU policies in the region, is 
very much needed. There are only limited works dedicated to WB countries’ position 
with respect to both Russia and the EU. So far academic research in this field focused 
either on Russia’s influence in WB region or EU accession negotiations, but a 
comprehensive approach is still lacking. For instance, Vachudova (2014) in her article 
EU leverage and National interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten 
Years On, discusses only WB position vis-à-vis the EU, while the article Western 
Balkans between Europe and Russia from the Centre for Security Studies (2015) tries to 
entail both dimensions.  
 
2.2. EU foothold in the Western Balkans 
 
Being both geographic and political, the concept of ˈWestern Balkansˈ was 
initially employed by US and European policymakers to describe the part of the Balkan 
Peninsula that remained outside of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
and the EU since the early 1990s (Bugajski 2014). Since then, different interpretations 
and understandings of the term have been brought to bear. One of such reading refers to 
the Western Balkans as a ˈblack holeˈ according to which WB countries, which remain 
outside the EU, simply continue to ˈexportˈ instability and uncertainty to the rest of 
Europe (Mylonas 2012). Milardović (2009) sees the term ˈWestern Balkansˈ as coined 
by the EU officials with no indications of any political significance and with the main 
aim of defining the EU strategy toward the region of ex-Yugoslavia, with the exception 
of Slovenia and the addition of Albania. Other authors focus more on explaining the 
concept ˈWestern Balkansˈ as a framework within which countries of ex-Yugoslavia 
function. Veljanoska (2014) defines following countries as part of Western Balkans: 
Albania, BiH, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Croatia. The same definition 
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is offered by the European Commission which sees this set of countries as being part of 
the WB.  
During the last two decades, the EU has shown unequivocal support for the 
gradual integration of WB countries into the EU. The Royamount process launched in 
December 1996 was the first EU initiative aimed at stabilizing the WB and the child of 
the immediate post-Dayton context, aiming to support the implementation of the Dayton 
Peace Accord and thus the EU’s engagement with the WB (Türkes &  Gökgöz 2006: 
674-675). In April 1997, the EU General Affairs Council adopted Regional Approach 
by establishing political and economic conditionality as a part of preparation for 
integration into European structures (Eur-Lex 2003) The manner in which 
conditionality was applied in the case of WB clarified the contours of a distinctly 
different mode of relations that the EU would maintain with the region: there was no 
prospect for rapid membership, but the countries meeting the conditions were to be 
rewarded with trade concessions, financial assistance, and economic cooperation on the 
part of the EU (Türkes &  Gökgöz 2006: 676).  
Furthermore, Kosovo crisis in 1999 gave a strong impetus to the EU to engage 
more within the WB region. Consequently, the initiative ended in launching Stability 
Pact (SP) for WB, which aimed at pursuing a clear stability and growth strategy in the 
region. The SP laid the foundation for SAP launched in 1999 and aimed at eventual EU 
membership by involving WB countries in a progressive partnership with a view of 
stabilizing the region and establishing a free-trade area. By launching the SAP, the WB 
have been – and still remain to be – a textbook example of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach, able to invest in post-conflict stabilization, peace and security in the long 
term (Prifti 2013: 14). The Thessaloniki summit in 2003 between the Heads of State and 
Government of the EU and WB countries paved the way for a wide range of concrete 
steps and initiatives aiming at integrating the WB – Albania, BiH, Croatia, FYROM, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo – in the EU (Prifti 2013: 13). It can be seen as a pivotal 
moment whereby the EU approach towards the region shifted from post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction (security) to democratic consolidation and European 
integration (Prifti 2013: 15).   
There are two ways of assessing the situation in the region. One is to adopt the 
perspective of the EU Commission in its progress reports and to establish, in true regatta 
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spirit, a ranking of the WB countries in their onwards march towards EU membership. 
The other is to combine a broader regional picture with the view from the Balkan states 
themselves, which shows the limits of individual, country-by-country approaches to the 
shared problems and remaining contentious issues and to EU integration (Rupnik 2011: 
7). The countries are in disarray with each having its own issues to address within EU 
negotiation process. BiH is trying to preserve federal structure in a post-Dayton spirit; 
FYROM is in a search of identity; Serbia struggles with defining its statehood after 
losing Kosovo, whereas Kosovo copes with the recognition of its sovereignty. For the 
first time the EU, a project conceived in order to relativize states’ sovereignty, has 
become involved in the formation of new nation-states that also aspire to become 
members of the Union (Rupnik 2011: 24).  
2.2.1. Countries position vis-à-vis EU and Russia  
 
The WB countries indeed have viable perspective for EU membership due to the 
geographical proximity to the EU, geostrategic importance of the region, its capacity as 
a potential future market, the potential of localized trouble spilling out over the region 
and into the EU, and the EU’s assumed role as moral and intellectual leader (Türkes & 
Gökgöz 2006: 689). After the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, Albania, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Croatia, FYROM, and BiH were all granted the status of ˈpotential 
candidatesˈ and subsumed under a new institutional framework (Renner & Traunner 
2009: 8). Since then, Croatia joined the EU, Serbia and Montenegro have been 
recognized as candidate countries, Albania became the official candidate in 2014 and is 
waiting for the opening of negotiations along with FYROM, whereas BiH and Kosovo 
are yet to change their status from potential to official EU candidates. Table 1 shows an 
overview of WB countries’ status with regard to both the EU and Russia.  
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Table 1 Western Balkan countries’ status with respect to the EU and Russia1 
  European Union 
 
 
Formal recognition of 
EU commitment 
De facto recognition of 
EU commitment 
Aspiring 
recognition 
of EU 
commitment 
 
 
EU 
member 
state 
Negotiations 
started 
Negotiations 
not started 
SAA 
ratified 
SAA not yet 
ratified 
Russia 
Positive 
relations 
 Serbia  
FYROM 
BiH 
 
Neutral 
relations 
Croatia   
 
 
 
Negative 
relations 
 Montenegro Albania  Kosovo 
 
Comparatively, Montenegro holds the highest performance in the accession 
negotiations, with having provisionally closed 25 and 26 chapter, Science and Research 
and Education and Culture, respectively (European Commission 2015). Montenegrin 
government is determined to join both the EU and NATO and made it one of the 
country’s priorities. Along with Montenegro, Serbia is the only country to have opened 
chapters within acquis. Even though negotiations on SAA started already in 2005, the 
EU had hampered the signing until Serbia did not demonstrate its cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an issue which was 
on the Serbian agenda for many years. Another important obstacle on the path toward 
the EU is Kosovo, although Serbia continues to be committed to the normalisation of its 
relations with Kosovo (Serbia 2015 progress report). 
As for the rest of ex-Yugoslav countries, BiH was recognized EU candidate 
country after the Thessaloniki summit in 2003. The main adversary to the BiH 
European integration is one of its two constitutional and legal entities – the Serb 
Republic, which is believed to be under direct influence of Russia. Under Dodik’s 
leadership, the Serb Republic is showing an impressive level of independence compared 
                                                             
1 The general assesment of countries' relations toward the EU was made in accordance with European 
Commission 2015 reports, whereas for Russia, the conclusions were made based on official governmental 
sources which indicate certain trends in political leadership's narrative toward Moscow  
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to any of the former parts of Yugoslavia which make him extremely popular in other 
parts of the Serbian ethnic realm (Serbia, Montenegro, and FYROM). This, in turn, 
means that Dodik is the only real reliable leader in the eyes of Kremlin, so the support 
he gets from there should not come as a surprise (Gajić 2015). 
Similarly to BiH’s Serb Republic, Macedonian government adheres to the same 
system of belief in which ˈfriendly relations with Russian Federation remain a special 
interest of Macedoniaˈ (Gjorge Ivanov 2014). The deep attachment to Russia in the 
country spurs the negative stance toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The same as 
Serbians, Macedonians are divided between turning to a more liberal model which is 
embodied in the EU and keeping the nationalist Orthodox view manifested in Russia. 
Although FYROM became the first Balkan country to ratify the SAA, the opening of 
negotiations chapters has been postponed by the European Council due to country’s 
name dispute with Greece.  
Albania and Kosovo, on the other hand, are the most outspoken critics of 
Russian foreign policy. Similarly to Kosovo, the fact that Russia does not recognize the 
independence of Kosovo where mainly Albanians live, affected bilateral relations 
between Albania and Russia, which are additionally backed by the fact that Albania is a 
member of NATO since 2009. Contrarily, the EU is dealing with Kosovo under the 
UNSC 1244/99 and guided by the International Court of Justice’s opinion on the 
Kosovo Declaration of Independence. The country faces the problem of its partial-
recognition by both EU member states and UN member countries (23 Member States 
and 110 UN member countries have recognized Kosovo as an independent state).  
By contrast, Croatia is the only country within this sample to have joined the EU 
in 2013. The country has also been one of the most vocal supporters of both the EU and 
NATO membership in the past two decades. Given that the country is largely Catholic, 
ideational ties with Russia do not make a strong argument, as it might be the case with 
other Orthodox WB countries. Nonetheless, Croatia finds Russia attractive in economic 
terms and one of the most promising partners in areas such as education, culture, and 
business (Russia beyond the headlines 2015).  
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2.2.2. Case studies selection 
 
The overall assessment of WB countries in the previous chapter has indicated 
both similarities and differences in countries’ attitude toward the EU and Russia. A 
more systematic analysis, thus, offered a preview of general trends that are in line with 
country’s stronger or looser commitment to the EU. Notwithstanding a certain degree of 
differences among countries which are not necessarily related to Russia, keeping all 
other internal and external factors constant, the broader analysis helps in detecting two 
cases which are illustrative enough to be a representative sample of the whole WB 
region. The method chosen for inspecting case selection criteria is Most Similar Systems 
Design (MSSD) based on Mill’s method of difference (Mill, 1843). MSSD aims at 
assessing the casual effect a given X has on Y by comparing a case of low development 
with the case of high development, seeing if we find the hypothesized variation in Y 
(Beach, 2012). Due to the diversity of components which are important for this research 
and following the assessment of countries’ features within MSSD, the cases of Croatia 
and Serbia are selected to be assessed in depth. The features taken from the Table 2 
remain mainly concerned with political matters and, thus, serve as main indicators of 
the extent to which Croatia and Serbia as independent countries differ. 
Table 2 Most Similar Systems Design  
Features Croatia Serbia 
Political transition ✔ ✔ 
Authoritarian leadership style ✔ ✔ 
Political system ✔ ✔ 
Strong nationalistic rhetoric ✔ ✔ 
Resolution of disputes ✗ ✗ 
EU commitment  ✔ ✔ 
Relations with Russia ✗ ✔ 
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When it comes to a) political transition, after the dissolution of Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), both countries underwent a transition to post-
Communist rule and tried to move toward a more democracy-led ruling system. With 
respect to the second feature b) authoritarian leadership style, after SFRY fell apart, 
both countries were ruled by two leaders which showed authoritarian characteristics to 
greater or lesser extent. Croatia under Franjo Tuđman and Serbia under Slobodan 
Milošević have often been seen as regimes with competitive authoritarianism (Kearns 
1998; Levitsky & Way 2002; Howard & Roessler 2006). In competitive 
authoritarianism regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the 
principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those 
rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional 
minimum standards for democracy (Levitsky & Way 2002: 52). 
With regards to c) political system both countries have constituted parliamentary 
democracy system, according to which the party or the winning coalition has the right to 
form a government and elect the leader who becomes PM. In the parliamentary 
democratic system, parties which have not succeeded in winning the majority are left in 
the opposition and their primary task is to question and criticize the ruling 
party/coalition. After the consolidation of democratic rule in now independent 
republics, in the beginning of the 2000s, the countries experienced d) strong nationalist 
rhetoric. The principles of internationalism and multi-ethnicity that dominated 
Yugoslav politics (and the European international system during the Cold War in 
response to the radical nationalism of Second World War) were quickly abandoned and 
replaced by ˈreturn to nationalismˈ, following similar trends in Eastern Europe after the 
1989 ˈrevolutionsˈ (Jović 2011: 4). Regarding the f) EU commitment both countries 
have shown a strong tendency toward the EU, with Croatia becoming a new member in 
2013. The official rhetoric in Serbian government indicates that the country is fully 
dedicated to the EU.  
In the matter of e) resolution of mutual disputes, not even 20 years after the 
Balkan wars broke out are two countries able to resolve mutual disputes. Although the 
EU tried to act as an interlocutor between the two sides, the disputes remain within the 
internal domain of affairs. The genocide lawsuits which countries filed against one 
another to International Court of Justice was rejected earlier in 2015 when the Court 
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ruled that both sides had committed war crimes but stopped short of qualifying them as 
genocide (International Court of Justice 2015). Put another way, Croatia and Serbia 
have undergone pretty much the same transition in building democracies and curtailing 
nationalist rhetoric with the aim of joining the EU. In the interest of this thesis, g) 
relations with Russia were identified as the external factor which makes these two 
countries not completely uniform. Other external factors, which might also show a 
divergence between two countries, are kept constant. The Table 2, therefore, shows that 
Croatia and Serbia are similar in several criteria stated above except their bilateral 
relations with Russia.  
Given that the primary aim is to assess countries’ ties with Russia, studying 
Croatia-Serbia relations in-depth go beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, one 
cannot disregard mutual tensions which seemed to be an important factor for EU 
aspirations of Croatia and Serbia. In 2016, Croatia vetoed Serbia EU talks in Chapter 23 
and Chapter 26 on the basis of complaints regarding the treatment of Croatian minority, 
cooperation with the ICTY and the jurisdiction of Serbian courts over war crimes 
committed in the 1990s. Although being of great relevance for the EU negotiations, 
these obstacles also reflect the outstanding issues in bilateral matters. As most of the 
former Yugoslav Republics, mutual relations between Croatia and Serbia were heavily 
influenced by the 1990s Balkan wars. A different interpretation of war memories, 
inadequate prosecution of war criminals, mutual indictments for genocide, the matter of 
national minorities, missing persons, and demarcation of the joint border continue to 
spur tensions among conservative and nationalistic government in both countries. The 
ongoing diplomatic pressure coming from both sides makes the situation more fragile 
inasmuch as two countries are seen as regional factors of the democratization. It is 
mostly because of the EU accession talks that both countries seek out compromises on 
the most sensitive issues only to demonstrate the willingness for rapprochement. 
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3. Methodology 
 
The choice has been made to engage with the case study as the main 
methodology method since the contextual conditions are pertinent to the phenomenon 
this thesis is seeking to examine. Stake (2000) explains case study as a common 
framework for conducting qualitative research, whereas Miles & Hubermann (1994) 
depict a case study as a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context. By 
virtue of this thesis, Yin’s interpretation and understanding of the case study method 
shall be used. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 2003: 13). Along these lines, the 
phenomenon entails country’s bilateral relations with Russia in the context of EU 
negotiations that are defined within the fixed framework. The case study, therefore, 
does a holistic inquiry by looking at the process or practice, the interaction within such 
a progress and the meaning of such interaction for a more generic understanding of the 
case under study (Njie & Asimiran 2014: 37).  
According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when: a) the 
focus of the study is to answer ˈhowˈ and ˈwhyˈ questions; b) you cannot manipulate the 
behaviour of those involved in the study; c) you want to cover contextual conditions 
because you believe are relevant to the phenomenon under study; d) the boundaries are 
not clear between the phenomenon and context. The cases within this thesis cover not 
only answers to ˈhowˈ and ˈwhyˈ questions but also deal with contextual conditions, i.e. 
geopolitical setting which is elaborated through the dimension of EU-Russia relations. 
The two cases are bounded by the time period (2008-2011/2012-2015) and by activity 
(EU accession negotiations).  
The preference was given to this timeline as the intervening variable (1) seeks to 
assess the periods in EU-Russia relations which are characterized as both positive and 
negative. The development of mutual relations between the EU and Russia is, thus, the 
main reason why this specific time frame was initially adopted. During the first period 
of analysis (2008-2011) both Serbia and Croatia were at one point in the process of 
negotiations with the EU, whereas during the second period of the analysis (2012-
2015), Croatia became member of the EU, so the strong alignment with EU rules and 
regulations was much more visible than in Serbia’s case. 
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For the purpose of this research, the cases of Croatia and Serbia are to be 
examined comprehensively. Drawing on the seven criteria discussed in the theoretical 
part, Croatia and Serbia are chosen as they resemble in many criteria related to their 
domestic political system and EU aspirations but diverge with respect to their stance on 
Russia – the main external factor identified in this research. The cases seek to explain 
the phenomenon of country’s close relations with Russia that is being influenced by the 
context within which it is situated for the sake of gaining new insights and detecting 
challenges of EU integration with regard to competitive powers in the region. As the 
main method, the case study fits in this thesis insofar as it strives to explain ˈhowˈ and 
ˈwhyˈ Russian influence on country’s foreign policy might affect EU negotiations. 
Although aware of the fact that in order to make general conclusions, variables which 
are kept constant should be also included, the goal is to detect general trends among 
WB countries with respect to their relations to Russia. The fact that allows 
generalisation is the pattern of similarity among WB countries which prevails over their 
differences.   
3.1. Independent variable  
 
Independent variable will be assessed through primary sources, such as visits 
and official statements of presidents, foreign ministers (MFA) and/or PM of the 
respective countries accessible on the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
of Government. The primary sources used for the analysis are retrieved based on (a) the 
status of high officials who are paying a visit or holding official talks (president, PM, 
MFA); (b) the topics discussed during the visits (foreign policy, security, economy, 
energy, and military); (c) the relevance with respect to country’s relations with Russia. 
Most of the data were obtained during mutual visits and meetings between high officials 
of Russia and the respective country. Each time the country would hold official talks 
with Russia or make a visit of such nature, the materials that were available through the 
official channels were assessed.  
In order to strengthen the outcome and define more closely countries’ relations 
with Russia, several more indicators are examined: trade relations, a visa-free regime 
with Russia and EU sanctions against Russia. These three components, along with the 
foreign policy outlook, are selected as the core elements of the independent variable 
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since they directly relate to the rational choice approach – the main theoretical concept 
in the thesis. Trade relations and visa-free regime speak of the profit maximization and 
cost-benefit mechanism in trading with Russia, whereas foreign policy outlook and 
sanctions indicate the political and bilateral dimension of the mutual relationship.  
Finally, since this research encompasses one country which is a member of the 
EU, that one being Croatia, one has to take into account that the country is bounded by 
the EU stance and national government cannot decide freely upon Russia-related issues, 
at least when it comes to the period after Croatia became a full-fledged member of the 
EU. The given period will be assessed in a different manner as the emphasis will be put 
on Croatia’s foreign policy attitude toward the EU decisions. Such an approach is 
incontestable since EU members states differ to a large extent on their foreign policy 
vis-à-vis Russia. Even though all EU member states are bound to align with EU 
decisions, there are still divergences in countries’ stances toward Russia, which are 
inextricably connected to their national foreign policies. 
3.2. Dependent variable   
 
The dependent variable, also defined as stalling on the Europeanization process, 
provides two main sources for the analysis, both of which are derived from the 
European Commission annual reports for the country in question. The EC document 
presents the detailed assessment of the state of play in each candidate country and 
potential candidate, what has been achieved over the last year, and set out guidelines on 
reform priorities (ENP and Enlargement Negotiations 2016). A progress report is 
presented and accepted as a neutral document which in a bureaucratic way assesses 
country’s advancement. At the same time, the reports provide even cleared guidance for 
what the countries are expected to do in both the short and long term (European 
Commission 2015b).  
Despite being neutral in nature, progress reports may be politically motivated 
and the overall assessment depends to a certain extent on country’s current political 
activity with respect to issues that are of special importance to the EU. The report on 
country’s general advancement toward the fulfillment of the acquis is needed because as 
soon as country closes chapters, it automatically increases its chances to be granted EU 
member status. The analysis of the Commission documents will be roughly divided into 
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two parts, the first one being a general assessment of the country progress with the 
emphasis on country’s main challenges for the current year, and the second one is an in-
depth analysis of Chapter 31 Foreign, security, and defence policy. Both parts will be 
thoroughly assessed using discourse analysis. 
Chapter 31 is chosen to be further scrutinized as it concerns country’s relations 
with 3
rd
 countries. The given chapter assesses country’s security and military 
dimension, which is of importance for relations with both the EU and Russia. When it 
comes to the EU, two dimensions should be fully compatible with the CSFP and CSDP 
in order for the chapter to be closed, whereas in regard to Russia, military and security 
sector is relevant insofar as it can further strengthen bilateral relations between 
countries.  
3.3. Intervening variable (1) 
 
The first intervening variable, EU-Russia relations, is defined based on the 
changing nature of the bilateral relationship between the EU and Russia. Owing to the 
gradual alteration of the positive and negative periods in EU-Russia relations, during 
which the relationship experienced ˈups and downsˈ, the research is divided into two 
time periods. While determining the exact time frame, the most recent events which 
defined EU-Russia relations as they are today were the main guideline. In this respect, 
the most recent period corresponds to the negative period in EU-Russia relations, which 
began in 2012 with the third term of president Putin on power, while the most recent 
period which can be characterized as positive started with Medvedev presidency in 
2008. In such a way, the analysis of intervening variable (1) seeks to explain the main 
challenges and successes in the EU-Russia relations in the past decade.  
3.4. Intervening variable (2) 
Rationalist choice approach, being the main theoretical concept of this thesis, 
emphasizes not only economic benefits of EU enlargement but also political economy 
of enlargement as such, which include constraints on governments and power of interest 
groups. In light of this, the second intervening variable is defined as Coalition 
government, which goes in line with the liberal intergovernmental approach according 
to which national interest emerge through domestic political conflict as societal groups 
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compete for political influence, national and transnational coalition form, and new 
policy alternatives are recognized by governments (Moravscik, 1993: 118). By 
examining differences and mainstream political discourse in respective countries, the 
results will show whether the coalition government can be disruptive in the case of WB 
countries accession to the EU. The political layout and the existence of cleavages 
among parties will reveal to what extent government coalitions influenced countries’ 
negotiations with the EU.  
Once the variables are measured, the following codes will be used to determine 
countries’ final positions. The intervening variable (IN) (1) is defined by dichotomous 
values (positive/negative). The independent variable (IV) is further divided into four 
components: foreign policy outlook (FP), trade relations (TR), visa-free regime (VF), 
and sanctions (SA). Each of the components within IV has its own system of values: a) 
FP rests on ordinal variable with three categories (strong/stable/weak) with ˈstrongˈ 
being the most positive, and ˈweakˈ the most negative; b) the values for TR are 
determined on the basis of ordinal variable with three categories (high/mid-low/low), 
with ˈhighˈ being the most positive and ˈlowˈ being the most negative; c) VF has 
dichotomous value (yes/no) as well as the fourth component d) SA (yes/no). The 
intervening variable (IN) (2) is determined based on dichotomous values 
(effective/ineffective) and the dependent variable (DV) has dichotomous values (yes/no) 
as well. 
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4. Analysis: Scrutinizing countries’ ties to Russia amid EU negotiations 
4.1. Foreign policy outlook (Croatia) 
 
Table 3 Croatia-Russia bilateral relations 
Timeline of Croatia-Russia official visits  
in the period of 2008-2016 
Date Location People Topic 
December 14, 
2009 
Moscow 
President Mesić, 
president Medvedev, 
PM Putin 
A lecture on ˈCroatia between 
2000-2010, a decade of changesˈ 
in MFA of Russian Federation 
March 2, 2010 Moscow PM Kosor, PM Putin 
Agreement on the Construction 
and Exploitation of a Gas 
Pipeline on Croatian Territory 
May 9, 2010 Moscow 
President Josipović, 
ex-president Mesić, 
president Medvedev 
Victory Day 
June 16, 2010 Moscow 
PM Jadranka Kosor, 
PM Putin 
Agreements on economy and 
technical cooperation, energy, 
and visa facilitation 
February 2, 
2013 
Munich 
President Josipović, 
PM Lavrov 
Military equipment and 
armament, economy and tourism 
 
Throughout the year 2008, no official visits between the Governments of Croatia 
and Russia occurred, but the relations were strained due to Russia-Georgia five-day war 
in August 2008. Though back then Croatia was merely an observer to NATO, Croatian 
PM Jandroković saw the opportunity in a geopolitical unrest in South Caucasus to prove 
Croatia’s loyalty to both NATO and the EU. After participating for the first time in 
NATO meeting on the Russo-Georgian war in Brussels headquarters, PM Jandroković 
aligned with NATO and stated that ˈRussia is expected to withdraw its troops from 
Georgia and to respect the signed agreement proposed by the French presidencyˈ 
(Nacional 2008). Albeit there was no doubt for Croatian right-wing government about 
whom to support on this matter, Croatian president Mesić distanced himself from 
statements made by his government. In his statement, though, the president noted how 
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ˈin this moment it is extremely important to avoid any moves which would lead to the 
escalations of tensions. Allegations and counter-allegations lead nowhere and instead of 
obstructing contacts, we should work on their intensificationˈ (Jutarnji list 2008). Social 
democratic president, thus, confirmed what had been the leitmotif of his presidency – 
intensifying cooperation with both Russia and the EU. Perceived as a Russia-friendly 
president, Mesić maintained amicable relations with both president Medvedev and PM 
Putin. PM Jadranka Kosor, who served as a Croatian PM from 2009-2011 under his 
term, was the first ever Croatian PM to make an official visit to Russia.  
In light of this, both president Mesić and PM Kosor sought to deepen economic 
ties with Russia and further strengthen mutual relations. ˈThere is a lot of space for 
progress in relations between Russian Federation and Croatiaˈ and ˈCroatia, being the 
28
th
 EU member, will absolutely support cooperation between the EU and Russiaˈ, 
noted PM Kosor in Moscow in March 2010 (Government of the Republic of Croatia 
2010). The political willingness and efforts put in deepening Croatian-Russian 
partnership resulted in PM Kosor’s third visit to Moscow in June 2010, where she and 
PM Putin discussed further areas of cooperation and the realisation of the South Stream 
pipeline project. During the visit, three agreements have been signed between 
Governments of Russia and Croatia; one was related to visa liberalisation, the second 
was on the construction and exploitation of gas pipeline on the territory of Croatia, and 
the last concerned economic and scientific research. By signing the ˈAgreement on the 
Construction and Exploitation of a Gas Pipeline on Croatian Territoryˈ, Croatia joined a 
group of several countries in the Balkans who had already agreed to participate 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Serbia, Slovenia, BiH), which enabled Russia to get an 
upper hand on engaging the countries to participate in Russian, rather than the EU and 
US initiated project ˈNabucco pipelineˈ. With numerous Balkan countries having signed 
the deal, it became clear that Russia will remain the most important supplier for 
increasingly demanding European market. The deal was seen as a win-win situation 
from a Croatian perspective, as new opportunities for Russian investments would come 
along the way.  
During the presidency of Josipović, Croatia’s relations with both EU and Russia 
were warm, which proves the president’s official participation in Victory Day in 
Moscow in 2010. Not only has the Croatian president Josipović, accompanied by 
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former president Mesić, attended the ceremony, but other EU and NATO member states 
marked their presence in Moscow as well. It was an indicator of a positive change in 
EU-Russia relations under Medvedev presidency. For the first time since the parade was 
organized, NATO troops took part in the Victory Day. Armed forces from France, the 
US, Poland, and Great Britain marked their presence in the parade and, by doing so, 
opened a new chapter in West-EU relations. It was not a coincidence that at that time 
the EU and Russia agreed on Partnership for Modernisation (P4M) initiative which 
additionally boosted cooperation with Russia. In light of this positive progress, Croatian 
leadership responded accordingly and continued to strengthen Croatia-Russia relations. 
Close relations between Croatia and Russia continued in 2013 when president 
Josipović held brief talks with MFA Lavrov on the sidelines of the Munich Security 
Conference and stated that ˈCroatia will become a member of the EU in less than half a 
year, which will mark a new chapter for relations between Croatia and Russia. We hope 
that our governments will use our membership in the EU to contribute to the 
cooperation between our two countriesˈ (Tportal 2013). Josipović also insinuated the 
possibility of purchasing Russian military equipment and airplanes. 
4.1.1. Trade relations  
 
By joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2012, Russia accepted 
multilateral obligations and rules under which a common tariff was set and import 
duties eliminated in order to boost the trade between countries signatories of WTO. 
Being still an EU candidate country, Croatia experienced positive changes in trade with 
Russia due to the reduction of average customs duties from 10% to 7,8% (Advance 
2012). After the financial crisis, the countries’ economy started to experience a 
moderate recovery, which was reflected in foreign trade as well. A common WTO tariff 
in trading with Russia enabled Croatia to predict legal framework and service 
liberalisation, which resulted in increased exports to Russia. In 2011, the total exports to 
Russia amounted to €229.867 thousand, whereas in 2012 it rose by 36%, accounting for 
€331.159 thousand in 2012 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics 2013). It coincided with an 
increased trade exchange between the EU and Russia, reaching its peak in 2012. The 
main incentive for such an increased cooperation was in Partnership for Modernisation 
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initiative, signed in 2010 by the European Commission and Russian government 
(European Commission 2012).  
Even after Croatia became the 28
th
 member of the EU, Croatia-Russia relations 
have been constructive as Russia hoped for positioning itself better in the WB region. 
The long talks about visa regime also gave Russia additional incentive to think that 
Croatia can be one of the countries to push for opening the question of free visa regime 
between the EU and Russia. ˈWe see and highly appreciate the efforts of Croatian 
government to facilitate the procedure for obtaining a visa to Croatia. We hope that now 
Croatia, being a full-fledged member of the European Union, shall actively opt for final 
removal of obstacles for a visa-free regime with Russiaˈ, were the words of the Russian 
ambassador to Croatia (Dnevnik 2014).  
Following Croatian membership to the EU, a gradual decrease in trade between 
Russia and Croatia was observed. Also, negative trends in trade exchange have been 
detected ever since Croatia along with other member states imposed sanctions on 
Russia. Due to sanctions and counter-sanctions by Russia, Croatia loses around €40 
million annually, which is significant if taking into account that Russian investments in 
Croatia amount to €500 million (Republika 2016). Unlike many other EU countries, 
Croatia recognized the importance of trade continuity with Russia. ˈThe Russian market 
is extremely important for Croatian companies and should be considered within the 
broader Eurasian Union, as well other CIS states. We cannot just sit tight and wait until 
sanctions are lifted. We have to help Croatian companies which are doing business for 
years on this market and have invested a lot of effortsˈ, stated Luka Burilović, the head 
of Croatian Chamber of Economy (Russia Beyond the Headlines 2015). To such a 
degree, regardless of trade revenues which were decreased in the past two years, Croatia 
kept its interest in cooperating with Russia. It also implied that there is the interest in 
shielding Russian-Croatian economic cooperation from a political crisis that started not 
long after Croatia joined the EU.  
Even without sanctions in 2014, the trade exchange between Croatia and Russia 
declined. According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics, in 2013 the downward trend 
started and trade exchange was reduced by 23% in comparison to the same period in 
2012. Export to Russian Federation decreased by 10, 6%, whereas import dropped by 
26, 5%. Regardless of that, Luka Burilović emphasized that ˈCroatian Chamber of 
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Economy has recognized the importance of Russian market for Croatia, which resulted 
in continuity in our economic cooperation. Not only have Croatian construction 
companies been present in the Russian market for a number of years, but there has also 
been an increased interest in food and agricultural sector to cooperate with Russian 
partnersˈ (Croatian Chamber of Economy 2015).  
However, the example of how political tensions can result in the rupture of the 
economic relations came on the eve of Croatian-Russian Economic Forum which was 
supposed to take place in November 2016. Although the head of the Croatian Chamber 
of Economy informed the public that the main reason behind the cancellation of the 
Forum lies in the lack of interest on behalf of Russian companies, it soon became clear 
that the move was politically motivated. Following PM Plenković’s official visit to 
Ukraine, where he stated that ˈCroatia’s experience in peaceful integration of occupied 
areas could be very useful to Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimeaˈ (Government of the 
Republic of Croatia 2016), Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concerns 
about Croatian meddling into Ukraine affairs. This political statement had consequences 
back home, where Russian ambassador Azimov explained that ˈRussian entrepreneurs 
are very patriotic. They do not agree with the fact that Croatia supports these sanctions. 
That is why Russian entrepreneurs did not want to come to Croatia. And that is the 
reason why Croatian-Russian economic forum did not take placeˈ (N1 2016).  
4.1.2. Sanctions  
 
During the period of strained EU-Russia relations, especially after Vilnius 
summit and the annexation of Crimea, Croatian government showed ambiguous stance 
toward Russia. On the one hand, the government stood firmly by the EU side when it 
came to the condemnation of Russian actions in Crimea and imposing sanctions, on the 
other hand, the government kept a pragmatic stance and strived to shield what was left 
of cooperation with Russia. The crisis in Ukraine coincided with Zoran Milanović’s 
post as the PM. Croatian leadership gave a signal how it does support Ukraine and that 
Russian moves in Crimea from country’s point of view are unacceptable. This was 
understandable as Croatia was a new member of the EU and the alignment with the EU 
resolutions was self-evident. In one of his interviews, PM Milanović stated how 
ˈUkraine is falling apart as a country, and Russia, who has gone beyond what is 
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acceptable in Crimea, should be warned not to go furtherˈ (Novilist 2014). MFA Pusić 
also firmly supported Ukraine by noting how ˈCroatia is absolutely in favour of 
recognizing the territorial integrity of Ukraineˈ (Vijesti HRT 2014). Going against the 
unanimous EU decision was, thus, not even considered among Croatian political 
leadership, as political relations with Moscow were always of a more irresolute nature.  
In this respect, rather than halting all political tasks with Russia, Croatia decided 
to adopt a pragmatic stance and campaigned for a two-way communication as the only 
way for resolving the unfolding crisis. The reasons behind it lie, however, not simply in 
Croatian political solidarity and willingness to put an end to a crisis on European 
doorstep, but in a comfortable position that Croatia found itself in. The independence in 
the energy sector, as well as positive indicators of business with Russia prior to the 
crisis, gave Croatia enough liberty to advocate for a political dialogue. The PM offered 
a less assertive stance towards Russia and expressed the hope for cooperation: ˈCroatia, 
luckily, does not necessarily need to take a radical political stance because it wants to 
work with Russia as much as it is possibleˈ (Novilist 2014). Also, the news about 
canceling the South Stream project, of which Croatia was supposed to be a part, came 
later in 2014, so except business deals Croatia that had already concluded, energy deal 
was now at stake, too. Croatia took a more pragmatic attitude and tried to take its own 
interests into consideration. Croatia and several other member states advocated for the 
exemption in sanctions of those agreements which had been signed prior to the events in 
Ukraine, as well as they tried to limit financial sanctions since Croatian company 
ˈAgrokorˈ had signed a loan agreement with Sberbank. These attempts, however, failed, 
and agreements with Russia were annulled. 
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4.2. Foreign policy outlook (Serbia) 
 
Table 4 Serbia-Russia bilateral relations 
Timeline of Serbia-Russia official visits  
in the period of 2008-2016 
Date Location People  Topic 
February 25, 
2008 
Belgrade 
PM Medvedev, MFA 
Lavrov, president Tadić 
South Stream pipeline; 
political talks 
July 17, 2008 Moscow 
MFA Jeremić, MFA 
Lavrov 
Economic and trade talks, 
Kosovo 
October 5, 2009 Moscow 
MFA Jeremić, MFA 
Lavrov 
Bilateral relations 
October 20, 
2009 
Belgrade 
President Medvedev, 
president Tadić 
Cooperation in energy, 
transport, culture, and 
education; Kosovo 
May 9, 2010 Moscow 
President Tadić, president 
Medvedev 
Victory Day 
March 23, 2011 Belgrade 
President Putin, president 
Boris Tadić 
Russia-Serbia economic talks 
April 19, 2011 Belgrade 
MFA Lavrov, MFA 
Jeremić, president Tadić 
Bilateral relations, Kosovo, 
situation in the region 
May 26, 2012 Moscow 
President Nikolić, 
president Putin 
South Stream pipeline, 
economic talks, Kosovo 
August 23, 2012 Moscow 
PM Vučić, Deputy PM 
Dmitry Rogozin 
Military and defence talks 
November 28, 
2012 
Belgrade 
Deputy PM Dmitry 
Rogozin, president Nikolić 
Bilateral talks 
May 23, 2013 Moscow 
PM Vučić, Minister of 
Defence Sergey Shoigu 
Military and defence talks 
October 16, 
2014 
Belgrade 
President Putin, president 
Nikolić, PM Vučić 
Belgrade military parade, 
trade talks, Kosovo 
June 16, 2014 Belgrade MFA Lavrov, MFA Dačić, Bilateral talks 
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May 15, 2015 Belgrade MFA Lavrov, MFA Dačić 
Political, trade and energy 
talks 
October 30, 
2015 
Moscow PM Vučić, president Putin 
Political, military and 
defence talks, Kosovo 
May 26, 2016 Moscow PM Vučić, president Putin Informal visit 
December 12, 
2016 
Belgrade 
MFA Lavrov, MFA Dačić, 
PM Vučić, president 
Nikolić 
Strategic partnership, trade 
talks, Kosovo 
 
Serbia-Russia relations reached new heights with Russia becoming Serbian 
voice in the UN Security Council on matters of Kosovo and Metohija status. Kosovo 
issue was an impetus for deepening relations, especially after 2007 when Russia refused 
to recognize Kosovo as an independent state. Numerous official visits on both sides 
serve as an example of a mutual commitment in the interest of harnessing the full 
potential of their relationship. 
In the period from 2008 to 2015, two Russian presidents, the PM and MFA 
visited Belgrade eight times, while Serbian officials were hosted in Moscow nine times 
in total. There was at least one official visit per year among the highest ranked officials 
of Serbia and Russia taking place either in Belgrade or Moscow. Although different in 
nature, most of the visits served the purpose of strengthening political and economic ties 
for the sake of creating a more beneficial environment for cooperation. Throughout the 
period of 2008-2011 when EU-Russia relations were positive, there have been eight 
official visits of presidential staff. President Medvedev in 2009 and president Putin in 
2011 (his first visit after ten years) marked their presence in Belgrade with the main aim 
of strengthening mutual relations. It was an opportunity for Serbia to combine two 
important foreign policy aspirations: EU membership and Russian partnership. Prior to 
president Medvedev’s official visit to Belgrade in 2009, Vuk Jeremić during his visit to 
Moscow emphasized: ˈalthough Serbia is in the process of European integration, which 
will end with Serbian full EU membership, Serbia and Russia will after that remain best 
friends. Russia is Serbian best friend and what we would like to is that Russia would 
feel the same way toward Russiaˈ (Mondo portal 2009).  
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Before his inauguration in 2012, president-elect Nikolić visited Moscow and 
held official talks with Putin. Although informal in official terms, this visit opened 
numerous questions about the politics of alternatives and whether the new Serbian 
leadership, in a spirit contrary to that of the electoral campaign, was going to minimize 
its links with the West and move more towards the East (Radeljić 2014: 253). 
Nonetheless, president Nikolić during his visit made clear that ˈSerbia’s ultimate 
foreign policy goal is EU membershipˈ, although he did emphasize that ˈSerbia will 
never join NATOˈ (RT news 2012). One of the purposes of the visit was also to attend 
the congress of Russia’s ruling party – United Russia – which gave a solid foundation 
for an even higher level of cooperation between two countries, one which includes the 
harmony of two political regimes. Following his inauguration in June 2012, president 
Nikolić paid a visit to Brussels, making it his first official visit abroad as a president and 
sending a message about Serbia’s commitment to the EU under his term. European 
Commission also recognized this move in president Juncker’s statement: ˈThis is 
President Nikolić's first official visit abroad since taking office and I see his presence 
here in Brussels as a clear sign of the priority the President and Serbia attach to their 
European reform agendaˈ (European Commission 2012).   
The year 2014 saw both Medvedev and Putin in Belgrade, where they strived to 
ensure the continuity of political and economic cooperation with Serbia. The 
presidential visit to Belgrade was seen as controversial as it was at times when EU-
Russia relations were on the brink of collapse due to Russian annexation of Crimea. 
Putin arrived to attend the military parade, but also to hold talks on South Stream gas 
pipeline that was largely disputed by the EU. The visit was yet another chance to ensure 
Serbia’s loyalty by emphasizing unconditional support for Kosovo. ˈRussia has taken 
a principled stance based not only on our friendship and proximity but also 
on international law and justice. This is a principled position and it cannot be adjusted 
in any way. We have always supported Serbia and will continue to do soˈ (Kremlin 
2014). Along the same lines, by referring to the ˈcommon Slavic background, language, 
faith, traditions, and culture, but also the fact that Russia and Serbia have always been 
on the same sideˈ, president Nikolić emphasized how ˈinvaluable Russian support for 
maintaining the territorial integrity and Serbian independence is, specifically regarding 
Kosovo and Metohijaˈ (Kremlin 2014). 
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The confirmation of such a stance came on the eve of Sergey Lavrov’s official 
visit to Belgrade in December 2016. It was the opportunity to institutionalize 
cooperation within a ˈPlan of Consultationsˈ between the two foreign ministries for the 
period 2015-2016, according to which official meetings will take place twice a year, in 
Moscow and Belgrade (Telegraf 2016). During the conference, MFA Dačić used the 
opportunity to praise Serbian relations with Russia and to emphasize Serbian stance 
toward NATO. ˈWithout Russia, it is impossible to protect our territorial sovereignty. 
When we talk about Russia, we talk about our future. Serbia will never be anti-Russian 
country. We will not join sanctions against Russia. And we certainly do not intend to 
become NATO membersˈ (Telegraf 2016b).  
4.2.1. Trade relations 
 
The Free Trade Agreement between the Socialist Federalist Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Russian Federation was signed in 2000 allowing customs-free trade in 
exports and imports on most of the Serbian and Russian products. The further trade 
liberalization between Russian Federation and Serbia was agreed in 2009 in Moscow 
which resulted in signing the Protocol for trade liberalization in 2011. The Agreement 
stipulates that goods produced in Serbia, i.e. which have at least 51% value added in the 
country, are considered of Serbian origin and exported to Russian Federation customs 
free (Development Agency of Serbia 2016). The Agreement makes Serbia the only 
country apart from Commonwealth of Independent States to agree on such a trade deal 
with Russian Federation and allows creating an attractive business environment for 
foreign investors and producers. Additionally, customs regime with the EU was agreed 
in 2008 allowing nearly all exports to enter the EU without customs duties on quantities. 
No other country than Serbia can boast of having such a widely open door to Eastern 
and Western integration markets, stretching from Vladivostok to Lisbon (Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung 2015: 35).  
It was also in 2009 when Serbian and Russian MFAs signed an agreement on 
abolishing visas for citizens of two countries. According to an agreement, citizens from 
one country may enter the territory of the other and stay up to one month, whereas 
persons with diplomatic and official passports may stay as long as 90 days (Government 
of the Republic of Serbia 2009). ˈ30 days for a visa-free stay in Russia is quite enough 
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for cultural or business events, adding that the agreement will also help to increase the 
trade exchange between Serbia and Russia and facilitate traveling for businessmen from 
both countriesˈ (Government of the Republic of Serbia 2009). 
Furthermore, EU members states amount to 63,8% of total trade, whereas the 
second most important trading partners for Serbia are countries signatories of The 
Agreement on Free Trade in the Balkans (European Integration office of Serbia 2016). 
Regardless of the fact that the EU remains by far Serbia’s main trade partner and 
investor, Russian foothold in Serbian economy is not to be neglected. In the year 2015 
total Serbian exports to Russian Federation amounted to $724,8 thousand, which makes 
Russia the fifth biggest export trading partner of Serbia in that year. In 2013 countries 
signed a ˈDeclaration on strategic partnershipˈ aiming at alleviating their cooperation on 
the highest level possible, which came at a time when Serbia promised to commit to 
obligations under the acquis. Among the most important agreements is also the one 
signed between the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Government of the 
city of Moscow, enabling broad cooperation in industry and traffic, trade, construction 
industry, opening of a common business information and trade centre, banking, tourism, 
mutual relations between chambers of commerce, exhibition activities, health care and 
joint ventures of small- and medium-sized enterprises (Simić 2016: 24).   
According to Serbian Chamber of Commerce, total trade exchange with Russian 
Federation in the first six months in 2014 was worth $1.64 billion and was higher by 
21.6% in comparison with the same period in 2013. In the first six months of 2015, total 
Serbian exports were 33% lower than the same period in 2014 which accounts for a 
significant decrease in total trade in a one-year period. Although Serbia gave its 
reassurance to the EU how it will not take the advantage of EU sanctions regime 
imposed on Russia due to the annexation of Crimea, the data prove otherwise. Serbian 
exports to Russia rose up to 68% in comparison with the year 2013. Only in the first six 
months of 2014, total exports were worth $117 million, whereas $185 million were 
exports for the whole year 2013 (Serbian Chamber of Commerce). Even though Serbia 
seized on the opportunity in 2014 and boosted its trade with Russia due to EU sanctions, 
it was not sufficient to make Russia Serbian’s first foreign trade partner, which it used 
to be in 2012. 
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The strongest economic linkage between Serbia and Russia, though, lies in the 
energy sector. In 2008, Serbia agreed to sell Gazprom the control over the state-owned 
oil company ˈNaftna Industrija Srbijeˈ (NIS) and an exclusive right to exploit natural 
resources in the country. The agreement was worth €400 million and stipulated 
modernisation of the whole technological complex as well as investing additional €500 
million in it by 2012 (Lukoil 2009). Moscow made a strategic move by obtaining 51% 
stake in NIS under what was disputed to be at a below-market price and won the gas 
pipeline war against the EU. The pro-Russian government in Serbia at that time justified 
the closure of a strategic energy deal as a country's necessity to secure energy stability 
in the region, which would be accomplished by constructing the South Stream project 
and preserve Kosovo within Serbian territory. At the end of 2014, it became clear that 
the South Stream project is not happening due to Europe's refusal to grant it Trans-
European Network status which would exempt it from Third Energy Package and 
enable Gazprom to reserve pipeline transportation for itself. Regardless of Putin's words 
how ˈthe project has not been canceled definitelyˈ (EurActiv 2016a), Serbian 
government clearly failed to ensure what was claimed to be a ˈdeal of the centuryˈ.  
4.2.2. Sanctions 
 
Despite country’s commitment to the EU, Serbian government continues to 
openly speak about the importance of preserving friendly and economically beneficial 
relations with Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia 2016). Only a 
decade ago this foreign policy narrative would not be read as something perplexing, but 
at times when EU-Russia relations remain shattered by the crisis in Ukraine, Serbia 
doubtlessly continues to challenge these relations.  
One of such challenges came in light of the annexation of Crimea when Serbia 
went as far as to refuse to align with the EU on sanctions against Russia even though the 
country gave its full support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Ukraine 2014). Back then Serbia was a full-fledged EU candidate member 
but had no legal obligations to align with sanctions. The main argument revolved 
around Serbian economy and damaging effect sanctions would have specifically in two 
areas. Firstly, energy sector would be severely affected since Russian Gazprom holds a 
majority stake in NIS, and, secondly, the financial sector would sharply fluctuate as 
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Serbian Sberbank VTB is a subsidiary of the Russian-owned bank. This would leave 
Serbian economy even more vulnerable and unable of undertaking reforms which are 
necessary to keep the pace with the EU obligations under acquis (EurActiv 2016b). 
When a new round of sanctions came on the EU agenda, Serbian FM Dačić stated how 
ˈtalks about imposing sanctions on Russia at this stage are out of questions since it goes 
against Serbian national interestˈ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia 
2016a).  
Even before Crimea happened, Serbia did not align with many hundreds of EU 
declarations in OSCE between 2007 and 2013 (Serbia 2013 progress report), but the 
non-alignment on sanctions was seen as controversial, mainly because it emphasized 
Serbia’s close relations with Russia. It came as a reward for Russian resolute support on 
Kosovo before the UN Security Council. Moscow has lobbied against recognizing 
Kosovo as a sovereign state in the international community and vetoed any possibility 
of Kosovo being admitted to the United Nations. MFA Dačić noted the following: ˈWe 
will not join sanctions or any restrictive measures against Russia, as well as we do not 
have any intention of joining NATO. In this respect, we would like to repeat once again 
that our desire to become a member of the EU absolutely has nothing to do with our 
relations with Russia, neither will we let that this desire is turned into anti-Russian 
attitudesˈ (Telegraf 2016). This, hence, implies how Russia is embedded in Serbian 
national interest which makes it indispensable for conducting foreign policy. At this 
moment when Serbia is still not a full-fledged member of the EU, the country is not 
bound to respect EU regulations and, thus, has enough space to maneuver its foreign 
policy. However, once Serbia becomes the EU member, the country will not be in the 
position to negotiate such an outcome, especially if the other member states are to be 
taken into consideration. 
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4.3. Stalling on the Europeanization process 
4.3.1. Croatia progress reports  
 
Already in the 2008 report, the European Commission recognized Croatian 
efforts in maintaining neighbourly relations in the region, which had become an 
essential part of Croatian progress toward the EU. Apart from relations with Serbia and 
border issues with Slovenia, other relations in the region were graded as positive and 
developing. During the period between Commission 2008 and 2009 reports, Croatia 
succeeded in closing seven more chapters which accounted to 28/35 closed chapters in 
total. In 2009 report, one of the pressing issues was the border dispute with Slovenia 
which caused Slovenian veto and holding back the accession negotiations.  
To such a degree, the Croatian progress toward the EU was caused more by its 
neighbours, rather than other external factors. In point of fact, in the 2008 progress 
report Russia is nowhere to be mentioned, which implies how Croatian progress toward 
the EU was not anyhow connected with the external actors, but internal issues, such as 
judicial, refugee questions, and minority problems. However, Commission 2009 and 
2010 progress reports recognized the first challenge with respect to Russia in the area of 
visa policy within the Chapter 24: Justice, freedom, and security. The government has 
adopted a decision on temporary liberalisation of the visa arrangements for citizens of 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kazakhstan for transit through Croatia or stays up to 
90 days between 1 April and 31 October 2010, which is not in line with the EU acquis 
(Croatia 2010 progress report). In 2011 progress report Croatia only partially aligned 
with EU visa policy, since Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were on the 
ˈnegativeˈ list of Regulation 539/2001 (Croatia 2011 progress report). The period during 
which the Croatian government decided to temporarily remove visa regime corresponds 
to the touristic season in Croatia, which usually takes place from May to October. The 
explanation was that the current visa regime and the procedure of issuing visas were 
additionally complicating Russian and Ukrainian tourist arrivals whose number have 
risen considerably in the past several years (Ministry of Tourism of Republic of Croatia 
2009).  
With respect to Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy, in the period 
2008-2011, Croatia had already made a substantial progress and had reached a high 
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level of alignment with the EU regulations, following positive expressions used to 
describe Croatia’s progress: ˈcountry remains committedˈ, ˈcontinued to supportˈ, 
ˈreinforced its participationˈ, ˈefforts are continuingˈ, ˈadopted the relevant decisionsˈ. 
The European Commission was fully satisfied with Croatia’s cooperation with an 
international organisation, especially the UN Security Council as a non-permanent 
member, OSCE, as well as NATO, whose member Croatia became in 2009. By 2011, 
Croatia was already a member of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO, 
which enabled the country to actively take part in the decision-making process in these 
organisations. In 2012, a year prior to joining the EU, Croatia succeeded in meeting all 
the requirements concerning Chapter 31 and was ready to implement the acquis. 
As regards to political criteria, major challenges in Croatian path toward the EU 
were mostly detected in internal affairs, such as public administration, widespread 
corruption and a lack of capacity in state bodies to fight against corruption and 
organised crime. Progress reports show how Croatia, despite being committed to 
reforms, still had to do considerable progress in the judiciary, anti-corruption policy, 
human rights promotion, with a special emphasis on impunity for war crimes, access to 
justice and freedom of expression (Croatia 2010 progress report). Economic criteria 
have been partially fulfilled, as Croatia managed to address the domestic consequences 
of the global and economic crisis. Structural weakness in the labour market, as well as 
the corruption which affect business environment and reducing the large role of the state 
in the economy remained biggest challenges for Croatia (Croatia 2010 progress report). 
In light of the above mentioned, during the last years of accession negotiations, 
Croatia did not experience any major challenges with respect to the implementation of 
the acquis. Regional disputes with Slovenia over borders and tensions with Serbia over 
Serb minority in Croatia, as well as unresolved war crimes and mutual file suits before 
ICTY, were to be strengthened in the future as regional dialogue had been set. The 
report analysis did not detect any proof of Russian impact on Croatian accession 
negotiations during the period 2008–2012 which also marked last years of negotiations. 
The only minor disagreement between Croatia and the EU on Russia issue concerned 
visa facilitation regime, but the decision to grant free visa regime for a certain period 
was economically motivated, rather than showing any signs of purposefully countering 
EU regulations.   
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4.3.2. Serbia progress reports  
 
Early Commission reports such is the one from 2008, was a reflection of SAP 
which provided a framework for EU-Serbia relations before Serbia became official 
candidate of the EU in 2011. Serbian path toward the EU was very much connected 
with Kosovo and the unresolved statehood, which has also been one of the pressing 
concerns of Serbian foreign policy. Since the Serbian government had not recognized 
Kosovo as an independent state, the Serbian government has been facing a challenge to 
satisfy EU demands concerning this issue, in particular.  
Before anything, a set of issues in Serbia’s progress in SAP has been recognized 
as relevant within political criteria: national security strategy, a defence strategy, a 
military doctrine, laws security, along with the public administration reform. Russian 
relations with Serbia were touched upon in the reports (2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011) 
with regards to energy sectors. As it is stated, under a Memorandum of Understanding 
with Russia on energy, several agreements were concluded, including privatisation and 
modernisation of NIS oil company, completion of the construction of an underground 
gas storage facility and the passing of the Northern branch of the South Stream pipeline 
through Serbia (Serbia 2008 progress report). There were no statements which would 
indicate that the agreement with Russia would, in any case, interfere with Serbian 
progress in EU negotiations. Moreover, European Commission has placed a special 
emphasis on the process of privatisation and liquidation of socially and state-owned 
enterprises as one of the key priorities of the European Partnership for Serbia (Serbia 
2010 progress report).  
By and large, throughout the period 2008-2011, while Serbia was still a potential 
EU candidate included in the SAP, the advancement toward the fulfillment of EU 
regulations and measures mostly depended on internal reforms and agreements which 
had to enter into force. European Commission had not indicated indirectly in the reports 
that any Serbian relations with the 3
rd
 country could possibly affect the negotiation 
process with Serbia in the future. What is more, it has assessed Serbia’s foreign policy 
cooperation with four main pillars – the EU, the US, Russia, and China, as being 
ˈgoodˈ. Even a deeper cooperation between Serbia and Russia within the agreement on 
the privatisation of Serbian oil company NIS came as no surprise for the EU and, 
moreover, was welcomed as a necessary act in order to finalise the privatisation of state-
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owned enterprises, as one of the core objectives for Serbia in the upcoming 
negotiations.   
As regards to the Chapter 31: Foreign, security, and defence policy, 2011 and 
2012 reports show Serbia’s positive progress in alignment with the majority of EU 
declarations and Council decisions, as well as participations in CSDP missions. Judging 
by the use of positive expressions ‒ ˈengage activelyˈ, ˈcontinued to implementˈ, 
ˈimproved its alignmentˈ, ˈagreed to participateˈ, ˈpreparations are well on trackˈ ‒ 
European Commission was satisfied with the overall advancement in Chapter 31. In 
comparison with other chapters in the report, Serbia has done most progress precisely in 
the area of foreign policy, since other areas are inextricably connected with Serbian 
domestic affairs, the judicial system, monetary and fiscal policies, social policy and 
employment. 
Unlike previous reports, the 2014 and 2015 progress reports brought more 
disagreements on CFSP. Although the 2014 report noted that Serbia supported the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the main problem was Serbia’s absence 
at the vote of UN General Assembly Resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
Another major disappointment for the European Commission came in light of restrictive 
measures which were introduced in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea when 
Serbia refused to adopted Council’s decision. At the end, overall assessment of Serbia’s 
performance in Chapter 31 lost its overly positive adjectives from the previous reports 
and was downgraded to an expression ˈpreparations in this field are on trackˈ (Serbia 
2014 progress report).  
In the 2015 progress report, the Commission recognized the newly formed 
geopolitical context with respect to Ukraine and placed a special emphasis on ˈthe 
improvement of alignment with EU declarations and Council decisionˈ alluding to 
Serbia’s refusal to align with the Council’s decision a year prior to it. Also, conducting 
joint military drills was seen as the ˈcontinuation of high-level contacts with Russiaˈ. 
The first military drill took place in September and the other one in October under a 
symbolic name Slavic Brotherhood 2016. Three countries already participated in such 
drills in 2015, but then it was on Russian territory. Even though not clearly stating, 
European Commission saw this act as a provocation from Serbia’s side, especially given 
that the military drills were held not far from the border with Croatia, a NATO member. 
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However, the same report welcomed Serbia’s decision to adopt Individual Partnership 
Action Plan and increase its cooperation with NATO. Evidence for this emerges from 
Serbia 2015 progress report, in which it is stressed that the agreement with NATO 
brought a new progress in Chapter 31. By doing so, Serbian foreign policy showed a 
certain level of inconsistency, especially taking into account NATO as Russia’s main 
threat in Eastern Europe.  
 
4.4. EU-Russia relations 
 
The legal framework of the EU-Russia relations has been defined throughout the 
1990s, starting with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which was 
signed in 1994 and ratified three years later. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the EU assisted post-Soviet countries via financial aid instruments. Broadening 
this perspective to West-Russia relations, one should take into account a wider 
dimension which includes transatlantic ties as well. Since it was the US who gradually 
deepened and broadened transatlantic cooperation with the EU, this country, if needed, 
shall be taken into account when examining EU-Russia relations. In this respect, when 
defining the nature of EU-Russia relations, in moments when literature allows and in 
case the alignment between EU and the US is present, the concepts ˈWest-Russia 
relationsˈ and ˈEU-Russia relationsˈ shall be used synonymously. As it was the case in 
the past, the EU agreed with the US on many issues concerning Russia, which was 
crucial for advancing EU-Russia relations. The only exception was 2003 when the US 
intervention in Iraq divided Europe between the supporters of intervention and the 
countries which opposed to it. 
The relations between Russia and the EU have been characterized by ˈups and 
downsˈ starting from the 1990s. Positive EU-Russia relations are marked with numbers 
(1), whereas strained EU-Russia relations are marked with letters (a). The guidelines for 
describing relationship were chosen according to the work of Forsberg and Haukkala 
(2016) The European Union and Russia: 
1) Formative period of early Yeltsin (1992-1994)  
Formative phase in EU-Russia relations followed right after the end of Cold War 
and can be characterized as an optimistic look in the future. Even though at that time the 
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EU was far more developed in both political and economic terms, Russia shared the 
same ˈEuropean valuesˈ, which was confirmed by PCA. The European Commission felt 
a compelling need to lock Russia into an institutional arrangement that would make the 
economic and political changes in the country irreversible – an argument that was at key 
junctures rather skilfully used by the Russians themselves (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016: 
9). The agreement stipulated cooperation not only in the economic sphere but also it 
provided an appropriate framework for political dialogue, social, financial and cultural 
cooperation which was founded on the principles of mutual advantage, mutual 
responsibility and mutual support (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 1997).  
a) The time of troubles (1994-2000) 
The stable relationship between the EU and Russia was put to the test in 1994 
when Russia unleashed a military campaign in the Republic of Chechnya. Criticism was 
energetically endorsed by some ˈpure Europeanˈ multilateral structures, including the 
EU and the Council of Europe. Meanwhile, at home, the war (at least during its initial 
stage) was supported by Russian public opinion as tough, painful, but indispensable 
operation to re-establish control over its breakaway territory that had been turned by its 
separatist authorities into a nucleus of anarchy and terrorism threatening to expand 
throughout the whole country (Baranovsky 2000: 456). Although the campaign initially 
put into question the ratification of PCA, after ending the hostilities in 1996, the 
agreement was resumed. In addition to it, Kosovo war in 1999 ‒ although not being a 
particular crisis in EU-Russia relations due to the US-led campaign ‒ influenced on the 
deterioration of EU-Russia relations. The US together with some member states used 
military intervention as an excuse to affect the regime change, but also it was done 
without an explicit mandate from the United Nations (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016; p. 
22). Renewed conflict in Chechnya left Europe isolated in Europe, its voting rights 
temporarily suspended in the Council of Europe and facing limited sanctions by the EU 
(Lynch 2003: 10).  
2)  The Putin promise (2000-2004) 
The aftermath of 9/11 offered Putin a new window of opportunity for 
rapprochement with the West and developing a common strategy in fighting terrorism. 
Russia’s friendly attitude toward the EU was best reflected in Putin’s speech in the 
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Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. ˈAs for European integration, we do not 
just support these processes, but we are looking to them with hopeˈ (Putin 2001). Later 
on, in 2003 at Saint Petersburg Summit, Four Common Spaces between the EU and 
Russia were agreed, which then confirmed their commitment to further strengthen their 
strategic partnership by giving substance to the concept of the Common European 
Economic Space (Hughes 2006: 9). Russia’s permanent representatives to the European 
Communities regarded Russia’s European priorities as shaping the practice of and 
forming a stable basis for, a comprehensive partnership (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016: 
25). 
b) Mutual disappointment (2004-2007) 
Iraq was another turning point in West-Russia relations which then triggered the 
internal division within the EU. France and Germany sided with Russia in opposing 
Washington’s decision to start their operation in Iraq. The deterioration of relations with 
the United States, and, to a lesser extent, Europe during 2004-2008 was fuelled by 
Putin’s anger over participation in colour revolutions in Georgia, and especially 
Ukraine, and aversion to American ˈunipolarityˈ (Lo 2016: 8). The EU’s role, in 
particular, in that context was perceived as negative because it had intervened in the 
electoral process and demanded new elections on the basis of election fraud, 
challenging the Russian blueprint for the future of Ukraine (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016: 
28). Another setback in the West-Russia relationship came on the eve of the largest 
round of NATO enlargement to the East when seven newly admitted EU member states 
also became part of NATO. The countries which once belonged to the Soviet Union and 
now referred to as ˈcommon neighbourhoodˈ suddenly became a fertile ground for 
contestation of EU and Russian foreign policy interests.  
3)  Medvedev interlude (2008-2011) 
During Medvedev’s presidency, there was a clear pro-Western rhetoric, 
especially in the circles around Medvedev. Medvedev’s relatively liberal reputation in 
the West hopes for the Russian-European rapprochement featured strongly on various 
quarters of Brussels and some capitals of EU member states (Moshes 2009: 1). The 
events in Libya in 2011 confirmed Medvedev’s desire to foster Euro-Atlantic agenda. 
During the 46
th
 Munich Security Conference, Medvedev stated how ˈthe principles 
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underlying our diplomacy and our foreign policy remain the sameˈ and went on to 
emphasize ˈmodernisation alliancesˈ with the US and the EU (Medvedev 2010). A 
positive attitude toward the EU resulted in singing the P4M at EU-Russia summit in 
2010. Parallel to the EU-level initiative, Russia, and practically every EU member state 
concluded bilateral modernization partnerships with detailed agendas, focusing on 
economic and legal cooperation, pushing the wider debate on values to the sidelines, 
despite Medvedev’s views of human rights as most basic and fundamental values 
(Forsberg & Haukkala 2016: 32). Up to now, P4M remained to be the last attempt of 
creating an institutional cooperative platform for partnership between the EU and 
Russia.  
c) Confrontation (2012-ongoing) 
Although Putin’s return to the Kremlin as president in 2012 did not immediately 
cause a crisis in relations with the West, it was in many ways the point in time when the 
irrevocable countdown towards a rupture began (Forsberg & Haukkala 2016:33). The 
events in Ukraine, which determined the direction of EU-Russia relations, started during 
the Vilnius Summit in 2013 when several EaP countries suspended negotiations with 
the EU (Rotaru 2014; Penkova 2014). Armenia was the first to cancel its negotiations 
with the EU and chose to join the Eurasian Economic Union instead. Russia ramped up 
pressure on other countries as well in order to prevent signing the agreement. A clear 
message was also sent to Moldova with an embargo on some food products, although 
the real target was Ukraine. The combination of threats and economics prospects 
swayed the Ukrainian government (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016: 36). It was then that 
the true crisis began and resulted in the annexation of Crimea on 18 March 2013. Since 
then, Moscow pursues completely different narrative toward both the EU and the US. 
Internationally it is leading a resurgent nationalism that openly defines US leadership 
and challenges the legitimacy of many existing global norms and institutions. The 
feelings of inferiority that once characterized Russian elite attitudes have given a way to 
a new militancy and, in public at least, aggressive self-confidence (Lo 2016: 16).  
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4.5. Coalition Governments 
4.5.1. Coalition government in Croatia 
The fact that Russia had nurtured friendly relations with Serbia, a country with 
whom Croatia had still a few unresolved disputes dating back to the Balkan wars, 
prevailed in the governmental decision to keep Russia at a safe distance and focus on 
the EU solely. Ever since the independence, Croatia sought to disassociate itself from 
other post-Yugoslav countries and become a part of Europe. Croatian nationalist 
rhetoric in the period of post-war reconstruction rested on the country’s strive to assume 
European identity and leave behind ˈYugoslav pastˈ, just like Slovenia did in 2004 by 
joining the EU. There was a broad national consensus among all major political parties 
regarding EU membership. Despite growing Euroscepticism, the national discourse was 
pro-European and cleavages between parties existed on the right-left ideological axis. 
Political parties were not bewildered about which side with respect to Russia they 
should take. Russia as EU’s neighbour to East had too many connections with Serbia 
and Croatia felt the extensive ˈfriendshipˈ would only slow down the country’s progress 
toward the EU. This line of thought was also confirmed in the media at that time: 
ˈWhen at the end of 2012 or beginning of 2013 we [Croatia] finally joins the EU, 
discussions about any sort of association with Yugoslav prefix will, fortunately, 
become, long-forgotten historyˈ (Butković 2010).  
In the period of 2008-2011, Croatia was ruled by a leftist president and a right-
wing coalition government. Although right-wing government led by Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ) tends to be more nationalistic and pro-European rather than it 
seeks to ensure its interest in Russia, few official visits under the right-wing government 
speak in favour of cooperation with Russia. In light of enhanced economic cooperation 
and an agreement to participate in South Stream pipeline, the cooperation between 
Russia and Croatia was experiencing positive outcomes. It shows that regardless of 
right-wing nationalistic rhetoric in the country at that time, Croatia did have successful 
cooperation with Russia in economy sector. The exception was the right-wing 
government in the first mandate of president Mesić who was from Social Democratic 
Party (SDP), the HDZ’s strongest rival on the Croatian political scene. SPD also built 
for itself a reputation of being the more democratic and modern of the two parties, 
particularly as the HDZ’s more nationalistic, authoritarian and clientelistic profile 
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became apparent in the second half of the 1990s (Stratulat 2014: 18). PM Sanader, 
unlike president Mesić, was not in favour of striking a deal with Kremlin on South 
Stream Pipeline. He rejected Putin’s offer to make Croatia a transit country through 
which the main South Stream pipeline would pass, which triggered discontent among 
many energy experts for what they considered to be governmental sloppiness. The 
political initiative to conclude any kind of energy agreement with Russia did not exist, 
neither Sanader’s government made commitments in terms of economic and trade deals.  
After the leftist coalition took the power in December 2011 and maintained PM 
position until 2015, not much had changed in terms of intensifying diplomatic and trade 
relations with Russia. The reason for this lies in the fact that under leftist presidency and 
the SDP-led coalition, Croatia entered the EU and lost much of its decision-making 
power when it came to relations with 3
rd
 countries, at least within multilateral EU 
framework. It was also a time when EU-Russia relations experienced a twist in their 
bilateral relations, as Putin came to power for the third time. The Kremlin began to 
actively try to stop the efforts of the EU’s Eastern Partners to move closer to Europe. 
Now Russia has changed from a ˈstrategic partnerˈ to a ˈstrategic problemˈ (Bildt 2015). 
Unlike in Serbian case, Croatian rapprochement toward Russia did not depend on the 
left and right parties, because even during the coalition of the leftist presidency and 
right-wing government, there have been major successes in dealing with Russia. 
In the contemporary geopolitical setting, right-wing government tends to 
downplay relations with Russia, which was seen on the example of PM Plenković’s 
statement in support of Ukraine which led to a diplomatic backlash with Russian 
counterparts. In June 2014 Croatian ambassador to Russian Federation resigned his post 
in order to continue his career in the private sector. The presidential elections were 
unfolding at that time and it was unclear whether the new president-elect will give its 
consent to the appointed ambassadors. Throughout 2015, the leftist government led by 
SDP and president Kitarović, freshly appointed president of the right-wing HDZ party, 
failed to agree on the most suitable candidate for Moscow. Only in the beginning of 
2017, the government and the president of Croatia came to an agreement about the new 
ambassador to Moscow and ended the broken diplomatic dialogue between Russia and 
Croatia. 
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Due to diplomatic pitfalls between two countries, official visits were almost 
non-existent. However, Russian ambassador to Croatia continues to put efforts in 
conserving so far successful trade exchange and business cooperation between the 
countries. On several occasions during his interviews, ambassador Azimov, pointed out 
that ˈRussia accepts Croatian membership to both NATO and the EU, two countries 
have no open questions, and Russia wants to develop better economic and political 
relations with Croatiaˈ (Vijesti HRT 2016; Nacional 2016; Večernji list 2016c). Also, 
he added that he does not ˈbind together the complexities which connect Croatia-Russia 
bilateral relations with Croatian membership to NATO and the EU. It is a sovereign 
choice of Croatia and we treat the choice of Croatian people in favour of European 
integration with respectˈ (Hlača 2017).   
4.5.2. Coalition government in Serbia 
Serbian political elite currently faces the daunting and sometimes contradictory 
tasks of maintaining the state’s current territorial boundaries, attracting investments in 
the economy and infrastructure, improving its trade relations with major partners, 
managing its relations with various international organizations and navigating complex 
security structure of the contemporary Western Balkans (Konitzer 2010: 2-3). Two 
major parties played an important role in either setting Serbia closer toward the EU or 
driving the country away from Europe. Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), being the 
successor of Milošević’s communist party, played a major role a decade ago in setting 
EU agenda and proceeding towards the EU integration. Serbian Progressive Party 
(SNS) that was established in 2008 after the split from Serbian Radical Party (SRS) opts 
for a more flexible position with regard to Serbia’s EU integration and relationship with 
Kosovo. At the level of rhetoric, the SNS and its leaders made considerable efforts to 
reform, distance themselves from their authoritarian past, and project an image of a pro-
European, moderately nationalistic and conservative party (Stratulat 2014: 55). Party 
maintains a close alliance with United Russia party which is detected in party’s official 
rhetoric.  
Contrary to the popular narrative, the current arrangement of interests allows 
major Serbian political actors to pursue policies directed towards both the EU and 
Russia, simultaneously acquiring benefits of relations with both while avoiding serious 
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costs in terms broken ties (Konitzer 2010: 3). Both of the SNS party leaders, ex-
president Boris Nikolić, and current PM Vučić share the same vision of Serbia joining 
the EU in due time, but their diplomatic moves and rhetoric on Russia differ. When 
Serbia was invited for the first time to participate in the military parade in Moscow on 
Victory Day in 2016, PM Vučić refused to come but had instead accepted an invitation 
of US vice president Joe Biden. Before departing for the US, PM Vučić reminded of 
Serbia's strategic goal to join the EU but went on to say that country’s aim is to sustain a 
correct partnership with Russia, referring to the example of Germany (Blic 2015). 
President Nikolić, on the other hand, pledged his loyalty to Russia reminding of Kosovo 
and Moscow’s unconditional support before the UN Security Council and UNESCO 
(Kremlin 2016).  
Under the presidency of Boris Tadić, two major coalitions took turn in the 
office, the first one being Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) ‒ national conservative and 
Christian Democratic party under PM Vojislav Koštunica ‒ and the other one being 
Democratic Party (DS), which is the major centre-left social-democratic party. Under 
DSS, Serbia continued to develop bilateral relations with Russia, which shows the 
consistency between nationalistic agenda of DSS and the Russian sentiment among 
ruling party at that time. Both PM Vojislav Koštunica and Serbian president Boris Tadić 
used South Stream pipeline as a leitmotiv during their campaign. The pro-Russian 
government in Serbia justified the closure of a strategic energy deal as a country's 
necessity to secure energy stability in the region, which would be accomplished by 
constructing the South Stream project. When in 2012 SNS coalition led by PM Ivica 
Dačić won the elections, Serbia started to position itself as pro-European. The country 
sought to deepen its relations with Russia, even at times when EU member states 
imposed sanctions on Russia and persisted on their stance to see Russia as their ally. 
However, it was under PM Dačić that Serbia decided to fully cooperate with ICTY and 
made efforts to extradite war general in order to comply with EU regulations. Hence, in 
this period, one can observe a positive pro-EU turn in the Serbian government with the 
approval of mostly all other political parties.  
Currently, the only political party that officially advocates the severance of ties 
with the EU is DSS. To that end, the DSS publicly embraces all nationalistic, openly 
pro-fascist and ultraconservative clerical groups, gathered around the Serbian Orthodox 
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Church. The party leader, Rašković Ivić, urged the president to call a referendum on 
country joining the EU (Kurir 2015). The main party’s narrative on the referendum was 
focused on changing the course of actions and leaving the EU behind because of its 
inability to cope with the refugee crisis. Putin’s party ‒ having won the majority in 2016 
parliamentary elections ‒ strongly supports DSS as well as the idea of holding a 
referendum. In 2016 Putin demanded from PM Vučić to call a referendum on the 
country joining the EU and NATO, but Serbian PM refused to even take it into 
consideration as EU membership is the main aim of Serbia’s foreign policy. Along 
these lines, the pro-Western and pro-Russian divide is entrenched in the political class 
despite all political parties currently in Parliament being in favor of EU integration 
(Torralba 2014).  
While there is a broad consensus among Serbian political parties with respect to 
EU membership and the importance of partnership with Russia, the unresolved 
statehood of Kosovo continues to be a dividing line in the current political landscape 
and weights heavier for Serbia than any other issue. Serbia’s progress toward the EU is 
largely defined by its parallel process of dealing with Kosovo and normalizing relations 
between two countries. The ruling coalition led by SNS and the president-elect Vučić 
stand for keeping Kosovo and Metohija within Serbian borders, although the initiatives 
of PM Vučić previously showed Serbia’s readiness to engage in a more meaningful 
dialogue with Kosovo. The second most important coalition partner SPS considers 
Kosovo and Metohija as an inseparable part of Serbia. Only a few parties that are more 
liberal advocate for Kosovo’s independence. In case Belgrade loses Russian support on 
Kosovo, its negotiation position will be weakened to the extent that may lead to a 
renewal of Kosovo’s status in the international community, the main thing Serbia is 
trying to avoid. Being fully aware that Kosovo is very much part of the political debate 
and as such directly influences country’s relations with Russia, examining this issue 
goes beyond the scope of this research. However, an indirect effect of the debate is 
addressed in European Commission progress reports.  
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4.6. Case studies comparison 
 
This chapter presents the results obtained from two cases, Croatia and Serbia. 
The main aim was to analyse countries in line with the defined variables, test two 
hypotheses and answer the research questions set in the introductory chapter. The 
independent, dependent and two intervening variables were subjected to analysis, 
results of which are summarized in the table below. The table is divided by intervening 
variable (1) on two periods – positive and negative – which relate directly to the 
research questions and hypotheses.  
For the purpose of evaluating the results efficiently, appropriate values were 
attached to tested variables. The first component of the independent variable, foreign 
policy outlook (FP), has three values i)ˈstrongˈ being the most positive and pointing out 
that the visits between two countries are carried out on a regular basis with bilateral 
relations developing gradually; ii) ˈstableˈ value presupposes bilateral relations on a 
working level via diplomatic representations, the main goal of which is to keep the 
current status of cooperation without any attempts of deepening it; iii) ˈweakˈ FP means 
that bilateral relations are reduced to the lowest level with the absence of top-level 
visits. The second component of independent variable Trade relations (TR) is defined 
similarly to FP with three values – ˈhighˈ, ˈmid-lowˈ, and ˈlowˈ. Since the results 
obtained with respect to this variable were straightforward, there was no need of 
developing extra categories in order to describe trade relations. ˈHighˈ TR means that a 
high level of interdependency is established between the units of analysis with financial 
revenues being beneficial to both parties. Mid-low TR is defined by the existence of 
trade relations between countries, but with no significant contribution to either one of 
the countries’ economy. Finally, ˈlowˈ TR describes the situation where trade between 
countries is reduced to a minimum.  
Additionally, the values of Coalition government are defined as ˈeffectiveˈ and 
ˈineffectiveˈ. The effective coalition government presupposes defined action plans and 
strategies with the aim of further developing or maintaining relations with Russia. The 
ineffective coalition government speaks of the lack of political willingness, strategic 
vision that might have an impact on the governmental decision to engage with and 
develop policies on Russia. Lastly, ˈyesˈ and ˈnoˈ values for the DV - Stalling on the 
Europeanization process – were defined in accordance with RQ1 and RQ2.  
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Table 5 Results of the analysis 
IN (1) Positive relations (2008-2011) 
 IV IN (2) DV 
 FP TR VF SA CG  
HR Stable High Yes - Effective No 
SR Strong High Yes - Effective No 
 
IN (1) Negative relations (2012-2015) 
 IV IN (2) DV 
 FP TR VF SA CG  
HR Weak Mid-low No Yes Ineffective No 
SR Strong High Yes No Effective Yes 
 
With respect to the IV Foreign policy outlook, Croatia-Russia high-level visits 
were more based on economic talks and cooperation in technical, energy and tourism 
sectors, rather than being politically and strategically motivated, as it was the case with 
Serbia. One of the reasons lies in Russian support for Kosovo and Metohija status, 
which is considered to be an important impetus for other areas of cooperation including, 
but not limited to, military, economy, and energy sector. In contrast to Serbia, Croatian 
state visits and official talks with Russia were mainly held in the 2008-2011 period, 
which coincides with the time when EU-Russia relations were positive. Conversely, 
Serbian–Russian relations were intensified in the second period of the analysis (2012-
2015) with official talks mostly concerning Kosovo, military and defence cooperation 
and other political issues.  
The wholly different outcome in two cases concerning foreign policy outlook is 
recognized in the number of official visits. Comparatively, Croatia never saw president 
Putin paying an official visit to Zagreb, neither had Russian MFA Sergey Lavrov been 
to Croatia during the two periods, whereas both Russian presidents and PMs (Medvedev 
and Putin), as well as MFA, visited Belgrade on several occasions. Presidents of Serbia 
showed close affiliation and willingness to engage with Kremlin on a higher level 
during their presidency, whereas in the case of Croatia, only during the two leftist 
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presidents in the first period, a closer bilateral cooperation was observed. In such a 
degree, the current Croatian president Grabar Kitarović shows an assertive stance 
toward Russia. 
Apropos of trade relations, unlike in the case of Serbia, Croatia and Russian 
Federation have not had any agreement which would stipulate free trade and free 
custom duties in foreign trade. Instead, Croatia has been the beneficiary of the 
Generalized System of Privileges (GSP) of Russian Federation, under which developed 
countries grant tariff preferences to developing and least developed countries (Štulec et 
al. 2014: 7). With Croatia becoming a new member of the EU, its status changed from 
being a beneficiary to the country offering those benefits to other countries. Serbia, on 
the other hand, has regulated customs regime with both the EU and Russia. The trade 
liberalization between Russia and Serbia was agreed in 2011, whereas three years 
earlier the customs regime with the EU on restricting customs duties was signed. Serbia 
is therefore in a more beneficial position with regards to trade with Russia, the proof of 
which is demonstrated in the higher trade revenues in Serbian case. After the sanctions 
against Russia were imposed by the EU, statistics in Croatia started to reflect low 
numbers in trade between two countries.  
Moreover, Croatian ties with Russia in the energy sector are far less developed 
than it is the case with Serbia, where the economic linkage in energy cooperation is the 
strongest. This, however, makes Serbia fully dependent on Russian exports of oil and 
gas, which threatens country’s energy security. Comparatively, Croatia is one of the EU 
member states which succeeded in cutting its dependence on Russian gas imports, 
following the construction of the Hungarian-Croatia interconnector. In addition to that, 
Croatia, unlike other neighbouring countries, holds 24 billion cubic metres of proven 
natural gas reserves (Natural Gas World 2015). It is, therefore, this energy strategy that 
places Croatia in a more comfortable position with respect to the energy security, a 
challenge that Serbia is still facing. Whilst both countries try to benefit from the trade 
with Russia to the highest extent possible, the methods they employ demonstrate a 
different understanding of the nature of their relations with Russia.  
Besides, the national policy in Croatia is notably similar to the approach Serbia 
took with respect to visa liberalisation. During the 2008-2011, both countries had in 
place a visa-free regime, at least for a certain number of months (the case of Croatia). In 
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years before joining the EU, due to the touristic season which continues to have a major 
stake in country’s economy, Croatia temporarily removed visa regime for citizens of 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia, whereas Serbia made it permanent. Whilst in Croatia 
a decision to lift the visa regime for Russian citizens was economically motivated, in 
Serbian case it was a friendly and strategic cooperation between the countries that made 
the decision possible. Had Croatia not joined the EU, it is highly likely that the visa-free 
regime would be in place during the touristic season, as numbers show a sharp decrease 
in tourists after the visa-free regime was annulled in 2013. In the second period of the 
analysis, Croatia had no choice in defining the visa policy towards Russia, as it aligned 
with the general EU stance to restrict visa-free regime for Russian citizens. Conversely, 
Serbia continues to decide freely upon the issue during the EU negotiations, and the 
installed visa-free regime contributes to the facilitation of the dialogue with Russia and 
deepening of economic ties.  
The divergence between Croatia and Serbia can be observed in the fourth 
component of IV – sanctions against Russia. Both countries showed the support for 
recognizing the territorial integrity of Ukraine but diverged in condemning the Russian 
actions in Crimea and imposing sanctions. It is notable to mention that Croatia was left 
with no choice in deciding on sanctions, as the decision was made unanimously 
between all member states. Had Croatia been in the situation as Serbia to freely decide 
on foreign policy trajectory, it is highly unlikely that the country would change its 
stance and refuse to align with the Western strategy. Known as a strong supporter of 
NATO and West in general, Croatian foreign policy narrative differs to a large extent 
from Serbian, which was clearly demonstrated on the example of sanctions. 
Nevertheless, both Serbia and Croatia tried to be as pragmatic as possible when dealing 
with sanctions regime against Russia; Croatia because of strong business and economic 
ties with Russia, and Serbia due to politically motivated reasons, the most important 
being that of Kosovo. Even in the circumstances when most EU countries refuse to 
think about any possibility of continuing cooperation with Russia, Croatia along with a 
few other member states tried to exempt business deals from the sanctions. Similarly, 
Serbia’s pragmatism lies in close political and bilateral ties with Russia, thus, Serbia 
saw the chance to prove Russia its loyalty in exchange for Moscow’s support on 
Kosovo.  
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Furthermore, the intervening variable Coalition government sought to inspect 
whether the ideology of coalition government and the (non-)existence of similar views 
of both the president and the ruling coalition have an impact on the quality of country’s 
bilateral relations with Russia. The outcomes show that coalition governments of 
respective countries adhere to a different system of belief and approaches concerning 
intensified political engagement with Moscow. The period 2008-2011 saw two right-
wing coalition governments in Croatia which showed different levels of willingness to 
engage in cooperation with Russia. Under PM Sanader, a coalition government was 
more reluctant to strike any deal with Moscow, even if that meant participating in what 
was said to be an important energy project for Croatia. Even though due to the more 
nationalist rhetoric of the right-wing government coalition in Croatia, one would expect 
of the government to alienate Russia as a potential partner, the leader of the right-wing 
government, PM Kosor, made sure not to repeat mistakes of her predecessor and made 
efforts to show Kremlin its readiness to engage more profoundly. It was not, therefore, 
the ideology which determined the relations with Russia, but the geopolitical context 
which was unfolding in 2013.  
Besides this, the current Croatian coalition government sits in contrast with 
coalition governments in Serbia throughout both periods. Whilst Croatian coalition 
government after joining the EU showed unilateral support for the EU integration and 
distanced itself from Russia, the Serbian coalition government under current PM Vučić 
is not as unequivocal in foreign policy and tends to shift preferences to both Moscow 
and Brussels. Throughout two periods, Serbian government was pro-Russian, which is 
proved by continuous state visits of presidents, PMs and MFAs to either Moscow or 
Belgrade. Also, the government did not play a major role in deterring relations with 
Russia, but it had caused additional tensions with the EU, especially after 2014 when 
Belgrade refused to align with EU sanctions. It thus seems that Serbia’s foreign policy 
tends to be more straightforward toward Russia, while Croatian government stays 
prudent and follows the political climate in the EU regarding Russia.   
Lastly, the governmental stance in military and defence sector also drove the 
country further away from the EU and in the past several years downplayed the success 
that Serbia made from 2008. The Chapter 31 proved to be decisive in this respect, as it 
was there that the EU showed its inappropriateness of Serbia’s behaviour which did not 
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correspond to EU regulations. Although Serbia was not legally bounded to align its 
national foreign policy with the EU, the Commission did hope that Serbia would react 
differently. On the other hand, given that the geopolitical setting regarding EU-Russia 
relations was more positive that it is now the case when Serbia is in the process of EU 
negotiations, the EU did not have such major concerns with respect to the Chapter 31. 
Moreover, Croatia did not go against regulations stipulated in Chapter 31 and was 
extremely cooperative in all CSDP missions and other sectors when necessary. Thus, if 
comparing the negotiations with the EU with respect to Russia, the conditions for 
Croatian negotiations with the EU were much more favourable than the ones Serbia has 
under current geopolitical developments, with the EU and Russia being on different 
sides.  
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5. Discussion: Evaluating Russian impact and acknowledging 
limitations 
 
This chapter reveals how the research undertaken in this thesis relates to the 
aims set in the introductory chapter, as well as it explains the main findings. The thesis 
sought to shed light on the WB countries' advancement toward the EU by placing an 
emphasis on one external actor – Russia. For that purpose, two research questions were 
developed and two hypotheses formulated in order to shift the focus of the analysis onto 
two specific periods of EU negotiations. The following findings might pave the way to 
different interpretations and leave space for future debate. These findings not only 
further broaden the knowledge on Russia’s role in the region but also offer more 
insights into the processes of possible interference in the accession negotiations.  
In the interest of focusing solely on the Russian factor, the research did not take 
into account additional aspects which might play a role in the Europeanization process. 
Though cultural and ideational facets lie behind the dynamic of the research, the focus 
was given to rational assumption to European integration. Two cases taken into account 
for this research showed a different level of preparedness in the EU accession 
negotiations, as well as a divergent stance toward Russia. With reference to the research 
question RQ1, How do country's close bilateral ties with Russia affect the 
Europeanization process, the following hypothesis H1 was formulated: Those WB 
countries with more historically, economically and geopolitically entrenched relations 
with Russia are more likely to stall the Europeanization process. The analysis of two 
cases affirmed that Serbia is the country which shows warmer historical, economic and 
geopolitical ties with Russia, as the H1 was strongly confirmed. On the other hand, a 
significant difference was not revealed in the case of Croatia in two periods covered by 
the analysis.  
Better results were obtained in the case of Serbia, where a substantive evidence 
of country’s closer economic, political and bilateral ties with Russia was detected. The 
Free Trade Agreement from 2000 makes Serbia the only country apart from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States to negotiate a trade liberalisation deal with 
Russia and create an attractive business environment for foreign investments. Another 
ˈDeclaration on strategic partnershipˈ agreement from 2013 elevates bilateral 
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cooperation on the highest level, insofar as it entails economic and trade, business 
contacts, increasing investments, cooperation between ministries of internal affairs on 
combating organized criminal, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Although Serbia 
reassured the EU how it will not take the advantage of EU sanctions imposed on Russia 
due to the annexation of Crimea, Serbian exports to Russia rose up to 68% in 
comparison with the year 2013. Another strong linkage between Serbia and Russia 
came in light of the energy deal in 2008 when Gazprom obtained 51% stake in the state-
controlled oil company NIS. The pro-Russian government in Serbia at that time justified 
the closure of a strategic energy deal as a country's necessity to secure energy stability 
in the region, which would be accomplished by constructing the South Stream project 
and preserving Kosovo within Serbian territory. Kosovo, thus, became an impetus for 
deepening bilateral relations, whereas increasing commitment to maintaining high 
diplomatic ties indicated mutual interests in harnessing the full potential of mutual 
relationship.  
Stalling on the Europeanization process was detected in Chapter 31 in the 
second period of the analysed time frame. Serbia 2014 and 2015 progress reports 
brought disagreements on behalf of the European Commission, following Serbia’s 
absence at the vote of UN General Assembly Resolution on the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine. Other evidence came in light of the illegal annexation of Crimea when Serbia 
chose not to align with Council’s decision on adopting restrictive measures. These two 
decisions shed a wholly new light on Serbia’s foreign policy outlook vis-à-vis Russia. It 
was then that the European Commission seemed to take into consideration the strong 
linkage between Serbia and Russia as a possible impediment to Serbia’s EU path. 
Although it cannot be said how Russian factor solely affected Serbia’s amiss 
performance in progress reports, country’s close ties with Russia did contribute to the 
overall degrading of Serbia’s advancement in the course of EU negotiations.  
As for the case of Croatia, during the 2008-2012 period, the European 
Commission had no major complaints about country’s connections with Russia, neither 
were Croatia-Russia ties scrutinized in Commission reports, as it was the case with 
Serbia. Croatia, wanting to be a textbook example of an EU candidate, did not want to 
risk accession negotiations by engaging with a more meaningful politically motivated 
relationship with Moscow, especially in the final years of negotiations when the 
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relationship between the EU and Russia faced obstacles. Croatian economic ties with 
Russia and existence of any kind of political and geopolitically motivated cooperation 
did not interfere with the accession negotiations. Historically speaking, Croatia had no 
major links with Russia, mostly because Russia is traditionally seen as the supporter of 
Serbia – Croatia’s troubled neighbour. The fact that Russia and Serbia share religious 
Orthodox links proved to be decisive in nurturing only an economically beneficial 
relationship with Moscow, a relationship which, nonetheless, could not affect Croatian 
negotiations with the EU. 
The only disagreement Croatia and the EU had over Russia was on the visa 
facilitation regime. In 2010, the Croatian government adopted a decision on temporary 
visa liberalisation for citizens of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan for transit through 
Croatia or stays up to 90 days. The decision was not in accordance with the EU 
regulations within the acquis as these countries were blacklisted in the EU Regulation 
539/2001. Croatia justified the decision as being economically beneficial to the touristic 
sector of the country since measures adopted by the EU could significantly affect the 
overall number of guests per touristic season. The reasons behind such a decision were, 
hence, economically motivated and indicated that Croatia was able to pursue more 
independent and pragmatic policy that was not necessarily coinciding with the EU 
policy. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the H1 was confirmed as in the sample of 
two cases Serbia is the one which nurtures closer bilateral ties with Russia and, by 
doing so, risks being criticized more by the European Commission. With respect to RQ1 
and H1, Serbia can act as a representative of those WB countries which maintain close 
geopolitical, economic and historical relations with Russia, which is also the reason 
why the findings of this thesis go beyond two cases scrutinized in the analysis. 
However, for a deeper insight into other WB countries which tend to share the same 
approach with Russia as cases discussed in this thesis, a further research should be 
conducted.  
With respect to the RQ2, How could the volatile nature of EU-Russia relations 
be the reason for stalling the Europeanization process in countries with closer ties to 
Russia?, the H2 was formulated: All else being equal, those WB countries with closer 
ties to Russia are more likely to stall the Europeanization process during periods of 
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increasingly strained EU-Russia relations. In light of RQ2, two periods are of relevance 
for the analysis (2008-2011/2012-2015). The first period is defined as a positive period 
of relations between the EU and Russia, whereas the second is characterized as a period 
of strained EU-Russia relations. H2 was confirmed by the findings of the analysis and 
proved to be righteous in defining countries which tend to stall more the 
Europeanization process during periods of increasingly strained EU-Russia relations. 
Again, as in the case of RQ1, the case of Serbia confirmed the H2. The findings further 
strengthened the conviction how H2 is correct and the external geopolitical context – 
defined in this research as EU-Russia relations – tends to influence country’s stance on 
Russia. Further analysis of independent variables (foreign policy outlook, trade 
relations, visa facilitation regime, and sanctions) and intervening variables (1) and (2) 
showed that EU-Russia relations have a significant impact on WB countries’ relations 
toward Russia, either in a positive or negative way.  
Throughout 2008-2011, or commonly referred to as the positive period of EU-
Russia relations, European Commission greeted deeper cooperation between Serbia and 
Russia in light of the privatisation of Serbian oil company NIS. Moreover, a closer 
Serbia-Russia energy cooperation was supported by the EU, as Russian Gazprom was 
the one to privatize NIS by buying the majority of shares from the state. In Chapter 31 
Foreign, security and defence policy, European Commission also noted Serbia’s 
positive progress in alignment with all major EU declarations and Council decisions 
and, at that time, Chapter 31 was one of the most advanced chapters within the acquis. 
Serbia 2014 and 2015 progress reports provided evidence of Serbia’s stalling the 
Europeanization process in the period of strained EU-Russia relations. Starting from 
2013 when EU-Russia relations hit a new low, Serbia’s general advancement toward the 
fulfillment of EU regulations within the acquis was notably lower in comparison with 
the previous years. High-level contacts with Russia were marked in the report as 
something that needs to be scrutinized more thoroughly. Unlike in previous years when 
high-level contacts and cooperation with Russia were not seen as something negative 
which would downgrade Serbia’s progress in Chapter 31, at times of far-fetched EU-
Russia relations, it seemed to have caused a problem for Serbia on foreign policy 
matters. 
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On the other hand, Croatia progress reports in the final years of accession 
negotiations (2011/2012) revealed no significant evidence of increased links with 
Moscow that could have interfered with the course of negotiations. The problems were 
mostly related to the justice department, internal affairs, and minority issues. Although 
Croatia became EU member in 2013 which makes it hard to extensively compare two 
periods as in the case of Serbia, changes in country’s stance toward Russia were 
nonetheless detected. The diplomatic communication between Zagreb and Moscow was 
ongoing during positive EU-Russia relations, which is demonstrated by the number of 
official visits. After 2010, Croatia held only one meaningful official talk with Moscow 
in February 2013, just a few months prior to joining the EU. General cooperation on 
economy, tourism, and the military armament was discussed, but no major agreement 
had been achieved.  
Starting from 2013, Croatia’s stance toward Russia deteriorated to a large extent, 
mostly because of the EU negative stance on Russia. It all culminated with Croatia not 
being able to appoint Croatian ambassador to Moscow for two years. Although Croatia, 
being the only EU country without its ambassador to Moscow, sent a clear message 
about its stance toward Russian foreign policy in Ukraine, in the wider context of 
damaged EU-Russia relations, the act of non-appointing the ambassador did not 
influence anyhow the relations between Zagreb and Moscow, as they were already all-
time low. At the beginning of 2017, the government and the president of Croatia came 
to an agreement about appointing a new ambassador, and by doing so, a two-year period 
of broken diplomatic ties ended.  
Respectively, H2 has confirmed that in both cases the general EU assertive 
stance toward Russia has a significant impact on countries’ foreign policy outlook. 
Whereas in the case of Serbia that represents countries which are more dependent on 
Russia, Croatia can speak for those WB countries which are closer to the EU and tend to 
show more pro-EU stance in both domestic and foreign policy matters. By proving H1 
and H2, a clear divergence in countries’ stance toward Russia was observed, and the 
level of countries’ commitment to the EU was formulated in a more concise manner. A 
room for generalisation certainly exists as other WB countries show the similar pattern 
of behaviour to one of the two cases analysed in the research. By applying the same 
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methods of analysis to other WB countries, the outcomes would confirm that Croatia 
and Serbia are appropriately labeled as a representative sample of the whole region.   
Intervening variables (1) and (2) were used to support RQ1 and RQ2. With 
respect to EU-Russia relations ‒ defined as an intervening variable (1) ‒ the analysis 
showed that in both cases the variable had an effect on Europeanization process. 
Strained EU-Russia relations proved to be decisive in Serbia’s less successful 
performance within the acquis, and for Croatia, strained relations meant more 
Europeanization and less attachment to Russia. Although initially it was thought that the 
geopolitical context, i.e. EU-Russia relations, would not be detrimental for determining 
country’s relations with Russia, closer inspection revealed that ‒ especially in the case 
of Croatia ‒ the geopolitical developments influenced severance of ties with Russia 
once Croatia became the EU member.  
As for intervening variable (2) Coalition government, the main aim was to 
inspect whether the ideology of coalition government and the (non-)existence of similar 
views of both the president and the ruling coalition have an impact on the quality of 
country’s bilateral relations with Russia. Due to the more nationalist rhetoric of the 
right-wing government coalition in Croatia, one would expect that the government 
alienates Russia as a potential partner, but the right-wing PM at that time made efforts 
to engage profoundly with Russia. Under the incumbent right-wing coalition 
government and rightist president, Croatia started to send politically negative signals to 
Moscow while at the same time trying to safeguard what is left of economic 
cooperation. During the positive EU-Russia relations when the right-wing government 
assumed the office, the relations with Russia were reportedly affirmative, as many talks 
on economy and energy cooperation were held. At times of strained EU-Russia 
relations, however, the governmental stance towards Russia experienced a slight 
downturn, although the leftist president Josipović showed a cooperative stance toward 
Russia. It is not, therefore, the ideology which affects Croatian relations with Russia, 
but rather a geopolitical context and the nature of EU-Russia relations.  
On the contrary, Serbian coalition government acted unilaterally throughout 
both periods covered by the analysis. The coalition government and two presidents 
showed a high level of affiliation toward Moscow, which implies that individual 
preferences of country’s officials play a role in determining the country’s foreign policy 
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outlook. The governmental stance in military and defence sector also drove the country 
further away from the EU and in the past several years downplayed the success in EU 
negotiations. Two military drills with Russian troops which were held in 2016 under a 
symbolic name Slavic Brotherhood 2016 near the border of a NATO member Croatia 
were seen as a provocation by the European Commission. Unlike Croatian coalition 
government which eventually gave in to the EU pressure in showing assertive stance 
toward Russia, the government of EU candidate members continued to follow the same 
trajectory with regards to its relations with Russia while at the same time trying to 
ensure the continuation of EU negotiations.  
This research can serve as a stepping stone for further exploration of the impact 
of EU-Russia relations on the Europeanization progress. Thereupon, the findings of the 
two cases can be generalized and serve as a valuable outcome for the WB region as a 
whole. Nonetheless, in order to obtain even more plausible results and explain 
divergences among all WB countries, a further in-depth examination of the bigger scale 
of cases (seven) is needed. What is also notable to mention is that the analysis did not 
show any unexpected or surprising findings at the very end. All the hypotheses were 
identified and confirmed. Having inspected all seven countries, the outcomes might 
have been different, but in a small number of countries, the limitations are also greater. 
In the following paragraphs, the limitations of this research will be discussed.  
To begin with, the time frame selected for this research is highly functional to 
H2 and serves its purpose, since the main aim was to see how two distinctive periods in 
geopolitical terms can affect Europeanization process differently. The periods were, 
hence, chosen confidently for the sake of testing H2. However, the results as such 
cannot be taken as granted beyond the scope of the timeframe discussed in the research. 
It means that the geopolitical context, as well as domestic outlook, may change in the 
near or distant future and cause new (un)expected developments in the WB region with 
respect to both EU and Russia. A major source of unreliability also lies in the 
intervening variable (2) Coalition government, which is prone to change every four 
years, when citizens vote in elections. Though it is unrealistic to expect that coalition 
government would take a sharp shift in defining country foreign policy outlook in a 
wholly different manner and, hence, oppose everything the previous government did in 
terms of maintaining/deteriorating relations with the EU and Russia, slight changes in 
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ideological approach can be expected with every new coalition government assuming 
the office. 
Secondly, the focus of the study was on the rational factors behind the European 
integration which are related to economic, geopolitical, and security interests, rather 
than being connected with ideational aspects such as religion, culture, language and so 
forth. The guiding thought was that rational factor might come to the fore when it 
comes to these dimensions and, consequently, influence country’s decision to either 
severe or advance ties with Russia. Accordingly, the sole focus of the analysis was 
precisely in those areas which account for rationality in decision-making. What the 
research did not encompass, however, are other dimensions which may also play a role 
for certain countries in terms of defining their relations with Russia. The aim of the 
thesis was to look into rational factors behind countries’ relations with Russia as a mean 
of affecting the Europeanization process, so a more holistic approach to the region is 
very much needed in order to detect which areas, in particular, are under threat of 
Russian influence and which features might trigger them the most. Certainly, the study 
showed that the majority of the country’s decisions are rooted in economic and 
geopolitical reasons, but rationality does not account for every decision taken by the 
government.  
As it was elaborated in the methodology part, Croatia was chosen as one of the 
sample countries, despite the fact that the country joined the EU in the second half of 
the second period. Thusly, being aware of the Croatian case specificity, it is worth 
taking into account that the same methods of analysis could not have been applied onto 
Croatia, as it was in the case with Serbia which remained the EU candidate during both 
periods of the analysis. Surely, this matter made it harder to inspect Croatian foreign 
policy outlook, which by joining the EU became a part of the bigger EU foreign policy 
vis-à-vis Russia. Nonetheless, after studying thoroughly both cases within the same 
analytical methods it became clear that even if Croatia had remained EU candidate 
throughout the whole period of analysis, the final outcomes would not have had an 
impact on the final revelations, as the country showed unilateral support for the EU 
even before joining the Union.  
Furthermore, the findings had strengthened the conviction that in dealing with 
WB countries, the EU has to continue developing a country-specific approach and 
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addressing especially those areas which are considered to be vulnerable to external 
and/or internal pressures of the country in question. These results offer indisputable 
evidence that the EU should not underestimate the complexity of the region and related 
to it Russian factor, which might play if not decisive then substantial role in driving 
certain countries farther from the EU and causing more unrests across the region. As 
anticipated, the findings also single out pressing concerns which do not necessarily 
derive from within the country but are influenced by the external factors. Even though 
this research emphasized the role of Russia as a significant factor in the region which 
might interfere with the EU negotiations, other actors should not be underestimated. 
The findings are generalised in two ways. As it was already acknowledged, the 
first facet contains generalisation within the WB region, as similar results would be 
obtained by applying the same methods of analysis to other WB countries – 
Montenegro, BiH, FYROM, Albania, and Kosovo. The historical legacy, similar 
cultural and language traits, the necessity of internal affairs reforms, memory politics, 
and the decision to become part of the EU place WB countries in the same position 
when it comes to Europeanization process. The other facet enables generalisation within 
the sphere of ˈOtherˈ credible actors whose interests in WB region do not necessarily 
diverge from Russian approach.  
On this point, the high-profile interests of Turkey and China in the region should 
not be neglected. The reason for increasing importance of the WB region for actors 
other than Russia lies mostly in economic and energy sector. For China, the WB region 
is important insofar as it fits in China’s foreign policy ˈThe Belt and Road Initiativeˈ 
which would increase China’s political and economic power and presence worldwide. 
Chinese investments in transport, infrastructure and energy projects across the region 
tend to ease the transport corridor from China to Europe, create additional jobs for 
Chinese workforce and find new investment opportunities in the region. On the other 
hand, Turkey’s presence has mostly been detected in BiH (where Muslim Bosnians 
comprise half of the country’s population) but also in FYROM, Albania, and Kosovo. 
The strong Ottoman legacy in the region creates a fertile ground for establishing 
networks of religious, cultural, and academic structures which might lead to the 
augmentation of political influence. The imminent tensions between Turkey and the EU 
are an additional incentive for Turkey to create problems in the region by promoting 
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non-democratic practices which could result in growing alienation from the EU. In the 
matter of declined support for the EU, Ankara would be in a position to gain an upper 
hand in the region and pursue its own agenda.  
Last but not least, this study had no intention of taking a normative stance in a 
sense of proving that the Russian interference can irrevocably damage Europeanization 
process of WB countries. It is certainly not a two faceted matter, meaning that in case a 
country gets one step closer to Russia, it automatically turns away from the EU. The 
study sought to assess the impact of Russia on EU negotiations without assuming that 
this same impact would have a detrimental effect on Europeanization process. The 
findings indicated that there exists the tendency toward Russian interference in the 
region and those countries that are closely affiliated to Russia can reach an impasse in 
the accession negotiations. On the one hand, Serbia is publicly set toward the EU and is 
undergoing serious reforms of the judicial system, cracking down on corruption and 
promoting human rights, whereas, on the other hand, the country openly challenged EU 
regulations by aligning with Russia in the midst of a geopolitical crisis in 2013.  
To conclude, this study gave an explanation for countries’ closer bilateral ties 
with Russia ‒ at least when it comes to rational-driven factors. The extent to which 
these ties can be detrimental for country’s relations with the EU was not discussed, 
which in itself leaves enough space for improvement. By proving that the connection 
with Russia within the context of EU negotiations exists, the primary objective of this 
thesis has been met and any other attempts at addressing this topic from a different 
angle would require additional academic research.  
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6. Conclusion: Framing Europeanization in the wider geopolitical 
context  
 
The regional cooperation and, eventually, integration serves not only Western 
Balkan countries, which are experiencing internal challenges and political tensions, but 
also EU interests in assisting the development of the region and ensuring stability in its 
neighbourhood. The Western Balkan region carries geostrategic significance for the 
security of the Mediterranean and Southern Europe, which serves as an incentive to 
international actors that strive to include the Western Balkans countries into any sort of 
regional (EU) and or/global (NATO) security complex. Russia as a regional power 
pursues an adversarial foreign policy in its neighbourhood aiming specifically at the 
countries that are actively engaged in dialogue with the EU. The objective is to obstruct 
Western policies intended to secure either European geopolitical landscape or promote 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in countries that are still coping with 
challenges of that kind. 
This thesis sought to shed light on the prospect of Western Balkan countries 
enlargement to the EU with consideration of Russia as an external actor. The intention 
was to explain the extent of Russian influence on the Europeanization process of 
Western Balkan countries and examine the factors that lie behind it. The cases of 
Croatia and Serbia were subjected to in-depth scrutiny within a closely defined 
framework divided into two periods (2008-2011/2012-2015). Bilateral ties with Russia 
were examined by looking at official visits between countries, trade relations with 
Russia, each country’s stance on sanctions, and the introduction of visa-free regime vis-
à-vis Russia, whereas the dependent variable Stalling on the Europeanization process, 
was assessed via European Commission annual progress reports with a special emphasis 
on Chapter 31 Foreign, security, and defence policy.  
The main theoretical framework applied in the thesis revolves around liberal 
intergovernmentalism and the rational approach to European integration. The theory of 
liberal intergovernmentalism as an updated version of intergovernmental 
institutionalism emphasizes the importance of domestic politics in national interest 
formulation. The intervening variable Coalition government was introduced for the 
purpose of studying the extent to which domestic political actors influence preference 
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formation with respect to the EU and Russia, as well as identifying political cleavages 
within the party system. Unlike liberal intergovernmentalism which underlines the 
member states as the main drivers of EU enlargement, rational approach to European 
integration takes into account applicants’ preferences which lie behind the 
Europeanization process. It offers a broader framework for inspecting Western Balkan 
applicants’ preferences that rest exclusively on rational factors related to economic, 
security, and geopolitical benefits. The thesis, thus, nominates rational and pragmatic 
incentive of Western Balkan countries’ bilateral relations with Russia amid EU 
accession talks over constructivist and ideational facets.  
The aim was to indicate that Western Balkan region does not rely solely on the 
EU’s influence, but also on other external factors which have a real possibility to exert 
influence through various channels including, but not limited to, pragmatic and 
materialistic factors which relate to economic, security, and geopolitical benefits that lie 
at the core of rational approach to European integration. The research showed that 
Russian leverage in countries which tend to nurture closer bilateral ties with Moscow 
comes at the expense of hindering the Europeanization process at times when EU-
Russia relations are overly negative. In the sample of two cases, Serbia showed a higher 
level of cooperation with Russia in a bilateral, economic and strategic sense, and offered 
less successful performance during accession talks with the EU. The evidence of a 
country stalling the Europeanization process throughout the period of negative EU-
Russia relations was observed in Chapter 31. This proved that the alternation in EU-
Russia relations has an impact on the overall outcome of WB countries’ attitudes toward 
the EU. In Croatia’s case, the geopolitical developments triggered severance of ties with 
Russia and rapprochement to the EU. Croatian stances on Russia throughout both 
periods shifted in accordance with the EU official foreign policy narrative.  
 To that end, given strong Russian presence in certain Western Balkan countries, 
Europeanization becomes more costly for these countries due to their inability to align 
with and commit to every EU ruling during the accession talks. The rationalist 
assumption presented in the thesis leads to several expectations with regard to 
economic, geopolitical and security areas. At the initial stage of negotiations, the EU is 
unable to impose strong conditionality toward candidate countries which then grants a 
promising niche to Russia to act as a security, financial and/or political guarantor in 
73 
 
those countries. Europeanization may be hindered as long as Russia imposes itself as a 
security provider in the region. By having Russia as an ally, political leadership in 
Western Balkan countries is prone to be influenced by the Kremlin while aligning with 
EU decisions that negatively affect Russia, as was the case with sanctions in 2014. 
Throughout the period of eight years, at least one official visit per year between Serbia 
and Russia took place either in Belgrade or Moscow. After the adoption of the first 
round of sanctions in 2014, both PM Medvedev and president Putin visited Belgrade in 
order to ensure the continuity of political and strategic cooperation with Serbia. In this 
respect, traditionally good relations with Russia ‒ serving as a rationalist factor ‒ affect 
the rapprochement towards the EU during the Europeanization process. 
 Furthermore, the research has also revealed that EU-Russia relations cannot be 
overlooked, and that wider geopolitical developments have an impact not only on the 
overall state of affairs in the EU, but also on EU relations with candidate countries. 
Geopolitical developments and global changes tend to influence the very nature of the 
EU and the formulation of its foreign policy toward Russia. EU-Russia relations are a 
reflection of what happens in the EU and its close neighbourhood. The developments in 
Eastern Ukraine and in the Middle East, specifically Syria, have pushed relations 
between the EU and Russia to all-time low, attributing it to different views on 
geopolitics and strategic interests in the wider region. Notwithstanding strong Russian 
presence in EaP countries through military, security and economic mechanisms, this 
research revealed that the Kremlin’s influence stretches to the Western Balkans as well. 
As a consequence, in the Western Balkans and former Soviet Space where Russia 
claims to have historical or privileged interests, countries experience strong Russian 
presence that is preventing them from committing completely to the horizontal 
institutionalization necessary for EU membership. Russia has made systematic attempts 
to destabilize Western efforts in bringing countries closer to the EU and NATO and has 
engaged in hybrid warfare in order to safeguard its interests in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
Washington’s [temporary] negligence of NATO has left the EU alone to deal 
with the threats emerging from an increasingly adversarial Russia and NATO’s second 
largest military power in the East – Turkey. In the event that NATO redefines its role, 
from a security consumer the EU will come forth as a security provider, a task which 
might be costly for the ˈUnion of 28ˈ considering upcoming lengthy and extensive 
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Brexit talks and a sharp deterioration of relations with Turkey. The rise of right-wing 
populism in Europe and the US, additionally spurred by Donald Trump’s presidency 
and extreme far-right parties in the EU, provokes growing nationalistic sentiment 
among Europeans who tend to advocate more and more for national policies instead of 
European ones. It deprives the EU of power and authority that is necessary in order to 
formulate EU foreign policy vis-à-vis countries which do not necessarily share 
European values and do not advocate for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
The many internal and external challenges in the past several years have damaged the 
image of the EU as a safe haven for all countries involved. Having to rely only on its 
own military and security forces in order to secure its close neighbourhood, the EU 
might not have enough resources and efforts to stretch enough to accept new members.  
 Western Balkans are seen as the turf where geopolitical struggle and cross-
cutting interests of the West and Russia meet. The research model that has been applied 
in this thesis may relate to other contexts, either to other candidate countries that are 
interested in EU membership or actors which have the potential to exert their influence 
in the region. Being on the brink of ethnic and political collapse, this research 
pinpointed possible complexities in the EU policy toward the region that are being 
exploited by other foreign actors, the most important being Russia, China, and Turkey. 
To say nothing of the still undefined American foreign policy toward the Eastern 
neighbourhood and Western Balkans countries that have been under the US protectorate 
since the Balkan wars ended. Increasing tensions in the region across several Western 
Balkans countries urge for devotion and a clear strategy on behalf of the EU. For these 
reasons, although perceived as a peripheral question, the enlargement to the Western 
Balkans might be crucial at times when the capacity of the EU has been put to the test.  
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